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This paper seeks to improve our understanding of household saving behaviour. It is based on an analysis 
of unit record data from March years 1984 to 1998 taken from the Household Economic Survey (HES). 
There are limitations of the data set but it provides the only available estimates of income and expenditure, 
from which saving is estimated as a residual. The HES is a series of cross-sectional surveys rather than a 
true panel, so we construct synthetic cohorts rather than tracking individual households. We use a range of 
regression models to separate out the effect of age, birth-year cohort and year on saving rates. The typical 
age profile for savings is hump-shaped, peaks around age 57 and does not become negative at older 
ages. Such a profile appears to have shifted down for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1939 relative to 
the younger and older cohorts studied. This pattern of cohort effects is robust to the inclusion of 
conditioning variables and to the trimming from the sample of households with either negative or very large 
ratios of savings to consumption. Preliminary investigation supports the hypothesis that changes in the 
economic and policy environment help explain the different saving behaviour of different birth cohorts. 
Tentative results suggest that more favourable environments are associated with lower rates of lifetime 
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1  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
* 
In many countries, concern has been raised by apparent falls in household saving 
rates. Low levels of household saving are linked to falling national saving and growing 
current account deficits on the one hand, and concern for the adequacy of retirement 
income on the other. There is a tendency to argue that savings are “too low” and for 
governments to attempt to intervene with policies designed to increase saving. These 
include tax breaks to individuals and education campaigns designed to raise 
awareness of the importance of saving.
1 
 
Typically saving is measured from the national accounts as the difference between 
income and consumption in the sense of a flow. In New Zealand these data show an 
apparent decline in household saving. We have some stock measure of implied saving 
found by taking the changes in aggregate household wealth
2. But until the results of the 
Household Saving Survey currently underway become available, we have no micro-
level data on household wealth. 
 
There are well-recognized problems with the definition and measurement of saving 
from aggregate data. But more crucial is the fact that aggregate saving could be 
observed to be quite low (or even negative) and this would not necessarily imply a 
“problem” for household retirement incomes. In an ageing population households in 
their working lives could be saving while those in their retirement years were drawing 
down their saving and on balance there may be little net saving observed, despite quite 
high levels of saving among the saving households. 
 
This is not to suggest that changing demographics alone could explain the fall in the 
household saving rate in New Zealand. In fact, if anything, household saving rates 
should be higher at present as much of the baby boom bulge is passing through its 
peak saving years of the lifecycle. Rather it is to highlight the fact that aggregate data 
can conceal what is happening at the individual household level.  In short, if we really 
want to understand what is happening to saving we have to examine the dynamics of 
household saving patterns. This is the primary objective of this paper. 
 
Individual data allows us to focus on particular economic, social and demographic 
groups and track their saving behaviour. This study uses individual records from the 
Household Expenditure Survey (HES) for a 15-year period. This is the only micro data 
set containing detailed information on income and expenditure. The survey does not 
provide direct estimates of saving. These have to be derived from the income and 
expenditure data, and the reader is alerted to the limitations that accompany this use of 





                                                 
* The authors thank Ivan Tuckwell for his help in preparing the data files, Dave Maré and Roger Hurnard 
for discussions on methodology, Dean Hyslop for suggestions to improve the paper, and participants in 
seminars at the University of Waikato and in the Treasury for useful comments. 
 
1 For a recent synthesis of key issues in household saving, see Attanasio and Banks (2001). 
2 See Claus and Scobie (2001).   5
1.1  Key Findings 
In summary, acknowledging the limitations of the data, we have established the 
following results: 
 
•  A very large share of total household saving comes from a small number of 
high-income households. 
•  Some 30 percent of all households used in the analysis, report negative 
saving. 
•  Saving rates are typically lower in households with  a female head, in part 
because female-headed households are disproportionately represented among 
the retirees and sole parents. 
•  There is considerable variation in saving rates across households even when 
other characteristics are common. 
•  Median rates of saving (or other quantile estimates) are typically more 
informative than average rates which can be influenced by outliers. 
•  Ethnicity does not account for differences in saving rates across households. 
•  Saving rates appear to have risen modestly over the period between 1984 and 
1998. 
•  The distribution of household saving is slightly more unequal in 1998 than in 
1984. 
•  By imposing some identifying restrictions on the data we are able to separate 
out the effect of age, cohort and year on saving rates. Consumption largely 
tracks income over the lifecycle but tends to peak earlier. This results in typical 
hump-shaped pattern of saving rates over the lifecycle. 
•  Saving rates rise throughout working life, peaking when household heads are 
between ages 55 and 60 and show a marked tendency to decline then until 
age 74 (which is the oldest age considered in the sample). 
•  Households with heads born between 1920 and 1934 had significantly lower 
lifetime saving rates than those born before or after this period. In particular 
those born after 1950 have significantly higher lifetime saving rates. Using 
different definitions of saving results in basically the same patterns. 
•  These patterns are robust when including controls for a range of household 
characteristics. 
•  This pattern of saving rates for different cohorts may reflect the different 
economic and social environment prevailing at critical points in the lifecycle. 
•  We assemble some preliminary evidence that the tax and benefit system has 
treated different cohorts rather differently, and suggest that this helps explain 
why some cohorts have lower saving rates than others. Their behaviour is 
seen as a response to the incentives or disincentives to save created by public 
policy interventions.  
 
Ideally, we would like to be able to use the insights about saving behaviour at the 
household level to help explain the aggregate saving trends observed in the national 
income data. Unfortunately, because the trends in the HES show saving rates rising, in 
contrast to the drop observed in the aggregate data (Figure 1), we clearly cannot use 
the former to explain the latter. Eventually, we are confident that the insights into 
individual saving behaviour from the micro data will be useful in explaining aggregate 
trends. But until we have a reconciliation and can explain the divergent series, then this 
task remains in the category of unfinished business.
3 
                                                 
3 A study aimed at that reconciliation is currently being undertaken by Statistics New Zealand.   6
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the basic patterns of household 
saving revealed in the HES data. The tabulations, while giving a useful first glimpse, do 
not necessarily reflect the underlying behaviour. For example, the median saving rate 
for households headed by females might be lower than the corresponding rate for 
male-headed households. However, as this comparison does not hold constant family 
type, dwelling tenure, ethnicity, or age (stage of the lifecycle), then arguably these 
factors could be confounding the comparison. Regression analyses presented in 
Section 6 are a more satisfactory way to explore the effect on saving of particular 
characteristics while holding constant other influences. 
 
Section 3 introduces the concept of synthetic cohorts, which form the basis of our 
analysis. Their construction is necessitated by the fact that we do not true longitudinal 
panel data which tracks specific individuals or households through time. Initial 
estimates of mean and median saving rates by cohort are presented in this section. 
 
Section 4 moves on to estimate the age and cohort effects based on cell means or 
quantiles. No further structure is imposed at this stage. The section concludes with 
estimates based on individual income, consumption and saving, where these estimates 
for individuals are themselves derived from a simple model of the household. 
 
Section 5 introduces controls for year effects. Macroeconomic shocks, which affect, 
say employment or earnings, may alter saving rates in that year. In order to allow for all 
three effects (age, cohort and year) we must impose some additional identifying 
structure as clearly these variables are linearly dependent. The structure we adopt 
follows Paxson (1996). 
 
In Section 6 we attempt to remove some of the noise in the data by smoothing. This is 
done through replacing the individual age effects with a fifth-order polynomial in age, 
and the one-year birth cohort effects with 5-year birth intervals. We introduce a set of 
conditioning variables (family type, ethnicity, dwelling tenure, labour market status and 
gender) in order to more clearly separate out the effects of age and cohort. Cohort is 
found to be an important variable in explaining differences in saving rates across 
households. In other words, when a person was born explains part of the differences in 
lifetime saving rates, all other factors being held constant. 
 
Throughout we have used a definition of saving that removes from current consumption 
items that provide a flow of services over an extended period; ie, we have sought to 
use an “economic” approach to defining savings. Such items as education expenses or 
motor vehicles are removed from current consumption. In Section 7 we examine the 
effect of different definitions on the results of the regression analyses. We find that the 
essential cohort differences in saving rates hold up under different definitions. 
 
It is then logical to ask why birth cohort appears as such a significant determinant of 
saving rates. We posit the hypothesis in Section 8 that an individual’s saving rate is in 
part a reflection of the economic and policy environment prevailing over their working 
life, and in particular applying during their peak saving years between ages 50 and 60. 
Certainly Thompson (1991) has argued that the benefits of the welfare state over the 
past 50 years have been distributed more on the basis of birth year than any notion of 
need, justice or desert.   
 
We argue that an individual would tend to have a lower lifetime saving rate if for 
example, their working life corresponded to a period of low unemployment, real 
earnings growth, generous welfare benefits and they held expectations of an assured   7
state pension. By comparing the lifetime environments of different cohorts we could 
test this hypothesis. We make some progress with this potentially complex task, by 
looking at some indicators of the environment facing different cohorts and finding at 
least a tentative association with the pattern of lifetime saving displayed by those born 
between 1920 and 1934 a nd those born before (1910-14) and after 1950. We 
conclude, perhaps unsurprisingly, that social welfare policies do seem to matter to the 
amount people are prepared to save. Further testing of this relationship awaits the 
development of long-term data series for at least the last one hundred years. 
 
 
2  HOUSEHOLD SAVING PATTERNS: A DESCRIPTION 
 
In this section we first describe the data source and the way we have used it to derive 
measures of saving. We then present some tabulations which provide a first glimpse of 
household saving patterns. 
 
Before setting out on this course we want to be very explicit in acknowledging the 
limitations of the data. These are summarised by Statistics New Zealand in the 
following quote: 
 
"For several reasons, care is required in making 
comparisons of expenditure with income from the 
Household Economic Survey, as the method of surveying 
income and expenditure does not provide for consistency 
at an individual respondent level.... 
 
Consequently, comparisons of total expenditure against 
total income are not valid at the household level. It follows 
that any comparisons of average expenditure statistics 
against average income statistics for groups of 





We have used the income and expenditure data from the HES to estimate saving. Our 
defence for this seeming disregard of the warning rests largely on the fact that there is 
no other source of micro-data for examining household saving behaviour. Moreover, 
analysts in other countries have used similar data sources, particularly the Family 
Expenditure Survey in the U nited Kingdom (Attanasio and Banks, 1998) and the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey in the United States (Attanasio, 1998). We have tried to 
eliminate some outliers, and we have a large sample, which might arguably 
compensate for the underlying deficiencies. But we accept that our results are only as 
good as the survey data from which they are derived. To the extent that the survey is 
not providing a proper picture of household saving, then it must be acknowledged that 
our results may not be meaningful. 
 
To construct a measure of household saving we subtract Current Consumption 
                                                 
4 Household Economic Survey Background Notes 1996/97, p. 17.   8
Expenditure (CCEx) from Disposable Income (YD)
5. To estimate CCEx, we take Total 
HH Expenditure (THHEx) and subtract from it the following categories with a view to 
developing an "economic” view of saving - ie expenditures that provide consumption 
benefits over more than one year (eg. consumer durables, educational fees) are 
excluded from CCEx. The following items are subtracted from total expenditures to 
derive our measure of consumption expenditure: 
 
Code  Description 
11  Net Capital Outlay and Related Expenses 
121  Mortgage- Principal Repayments 
1300  Building Permit fees 
210 -217  Home Appliances 
220-222  Large Household Equipment 
230-233  Furniture 
25  Floor Coverings 
42  Road Vehicles 
5506  Purchase of Racehorses 
5507  Purchase of Livestock 
565-566  Office Equipment 
58  Recreational Vehicles 
62  Educational and Tuitional Services 
6702-6703  Kindergarten Playcentre and Pre-School fees 
690  Contributions to Savings 
71  Sales  
72  Trade-ins 
 
The data cover the years 1983-84 to 1997-98. We refer to these years by the latter 
year; ie, 1984 and 1998. A total sample of 50,624 households was available over these 
15 years. We have removed all observations where household disposable income was 
reported as negative (some 330 households)
6. Further we have truncated the sample to 
remove all observations where the age of the household head was reported as less 
than 19 or greater than 74 at the time of the survey. This left us with a sample of 46,269 
households.  
 
Our justification for restricting the sample to the age range 19-74 is that those less than 
19 were not considered important for studying lifetime saving patterns, while amongst 
the elderly, the HES does not cover institutions so those elderly living in rest homes are 
not included. This means that in the upper age groups we have an incomplete sample 
based only on those living on their own or as part of another household and this group 
may not be representative of the full population of the elderly. 
 
Rather than taking the ratio of saving to disposable income, we have chosen to follow 
Attanasio (1998) and calculate saving rates by the ratio of saving to consumption. This 
has the advantage of being defined even when reported disposable income is zero
7.  
                                                 
5 Disposable income is defined as the sum of income from all sources including government benefits, less 
taxes. 
6 We recognise that these households might include some self-employed unincorporated businesses, 
whose business expenditures result in negative reported incomes.  
7 Denote saving by S, consumption expenditure by X and disposable income by YD. Then: 
S/YD =( S/X) .(X/YD); ie, the ratio of saving to income is a monotonic transform of the ratio of saving to 
consumption and the saving ratios reported in this study can be converted by multiplying by the average 
propensity to consume.   9
 
A decision was needed as to the unit of analysis. Should it be the individual or the 
household? There is no clear answer to this; both have advantages and drawbacks. 
The HES reports income for each individual in the household, and expenditure on a 
household-wide basis. This means that to compute saving, one needs to either: 
 
a.  allocate expenditure to individuals and then subtract from reported incomes to 
find individual saving levels; or 
b.  combine the incomes of individuals to a total household income and subtract 
reported expenditure. 
 
We have chosen the second option, believing that many saving decisions are taken on 
a household basis, and considering that allocating expenditure to individuals would 
have created some spurious saving estimates, especially for those household 
members who are not participating in the labour force. 
 
We have defined the age, gender, labour market status and ethnicity of the household 
based on the reported characteristics of the head. However we also report results 
based on household shares (eg., the share who are working, who are male, etc).  
 
Table 2.1 reports the number of observations in each year together with the saving 
rates at the mean, median, 25
th and 75
th percentiles. The mean is clearly influenced by 
extreme values, so frequently it will be helpful to focus on the median saving rate. The 
final column reports the ratio of the averages of saving to consumption, as distinct from 
the average (or quantile) of the ratios.   
 
The results in Table 2.2 show the enormous underlying variability in the data. 
Household savings vary between -$1.56 million and +$0.78m. Among any one group 
with the same rate of saving (eg 0.20 to 0.29) consumption expenditures vary from 
$2,950 to $125,474, and their absolute level of saving varies from $879 to $32,241. 
 
How do saving rates vary with household income? Predictably, median savings rates 
rise with income. Indeed, over one-half of total household savings over our 15-year 
period are generated by those in the richest decile of households. Absolute savings are 
negative in the three lowest deciles. Of course not all households in these three deciles 
have negative saving rates, as shown by the values of the 75
th percentile (see Table 
2.3). 
 
What has happened to the saving rates over the  period of the survey? The 
observations in each income decile were regressed on time. The lower three deciles 
show a negative trend and the upper income deciles show an increasingly positive 
trend. In other words, with some increased inequality in the distribution of income, there 
appears to have been a parallel increase in the inequality of saving. The Lorenz curves 




The cumulative distributions of the saving rates for the same two years are plotted in 
Figure 2.2, showing that 30 percent of household have negative estimated saving 
rates, a further 30 percent have rates between 0.0 and 0.5, while the remaining 40 
percent have rates over 0.5; ie, they report income at least 150 percent higher than 
their consumption spending. The increasing inequality in saving rates, amongst both 
                                                 
8 Note that these Lorenz curves are only plotted for households with positive saving rates.   10
the negative and positive savers, is also apparent from the  “straightening” of the 
cumulative distribution in the latter s urvey years because this implies that the 
underlying density function is getting more spread out. 
 
Is saving confined to richer households? It depends on how one defines “rich”. When 
ranking according to household disposable income, the poorest three deciles show 
dissaving on average, while the level of saving for the richest decile of households is 
over five-times the average (see Table 2.4).  
 
To check if this pattern is robust, savings by expenditure decile can be examined 
because, on average, households that are well-off in terms of income are also well-off 
in terms of expenditures (the correlation across the deciles in Table 2.4 is 0.99). But 
when ranking according to expenditures, the level of savings is roughly constant across 
the poorest nine deciles (implying a falling savings rate), while the richest decile in 
terms of household expenditures shows negative saving on average. 
 
One plausible explanation for these patterns is measurement error. If income and 
expenditure are independently measured, at least to some extent, households who 
overstate their incomes will also, on average, overstate their savings, while households 
who overstate their consumption expenditures will corresponding understate their 
saving (Deaton, 1997 p.31). The top deciles of income may contain a large fraction of 
households with overstated incomes and will thus show the highest savings rates, with 
the opposite effect for the top deciles of consumption whose overstated expenditures 
give the appearance of negative saving
9.  
 
We next present saving rates for various population sub-groups (Table 2.5). Female-
headed households have lower saving rates, in part because they are over-
represented among the oldest category and as sole parents. Households not in the 
labour force have saving rates a third less than those in the labour force, but there are 
no apparent differences by ethnicity. The age pattern of saving rates conforms to the 
expected hump-shaped lifecycle pattern. Sole parent families have a markedly lower 
saving rate than all other household types. 
 
However, these tabulations provide only limited information as they do not attempt to 
hold other factors constant. That is the task of the regression models in Section 6. 
 
3  THE COHORT APPROACH AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA  
To study the lifecycle profiles of saving we would ideally have panel data, where the 
same people are tracked over time. However, the available panel surveys in New 
Zealand are restricted to cohorts of young people who were born in the 1970s, and so 
are unsuitable for studying lifecycle phenomena.
10 But the availability of a time-series 
                                                 
9 An alternative explanation is that instead of measurement error, the data may be revealing the effects of 
“transitory income”. A transitory rise in income, not expected to be sustained in a permanent manner, 
would not necessarily induce a corresponding rise in consumption. Likewise a transitory fall in income, 
would not necessarily be accompanied by a cut in consumption. This raises the possibility that in terms of 
permanent income saving among the lower actual income deciles is understated and amongst the higher 
income levels is overstated.  
 
10 The “snapshot” offered by a single cross-section is also unsuitable for observing life-cycle patterns 
because although a variety of ages are observed in a cross-section, they also represent different birth   11
of cross-sectional Household Economic Surveys allows us to construct  synthetic 
panels following methods described by Deaton (1985).  
 
The key idea with synthetic panels is to divide the  sample into groups whose 
membership is assumed to be fixed over time. The average behaviour of these groups 
is then tracked over time and as long as the sample is continually representative of the 
population that has fixed composition, estimates from these synthetic panel data 
should be consistent with estimates from genuine panel data on individuals
11. 
 
In the context of saving behaviour, the synthetic panel method requires that we form 
various cohorts defined by date of birth and then follow them across the successive 
Household Economic Surveys
12. Provided the population is not much affected by 
immigration and emigration, and provided that a particular cohort is not so old that its 
members are dying in significant numbers, each successive survey lets us track 
movements in the average behaviour of each cohort over time (Deaton, 1997). For 
example, we can potentially look at the average saving rate of people who are 30-years 
old in the 1985 survey and connect that to the average saving rate of those who are 
31-years old in the 1986 survey because both averages refer to the cohort born in 
1955. Not only may these averages have many of the properties of panel data, they 
may also avoid some of the problems. In particular: 
•  Cohort data are constructed from fresh samples each year, so problems of 
sample attrition should be less severe, and 
•  There may be less bias due to measurement error because we are typically 
working with a cohort average (or some other quantile), which should reduce 
the impact of idiosyncratic variability that is a feature of data on individuals. 
 
However, there are at least three practical problems with the use of synthetic panels for 
studying saving behaviour in the Household Economic Survey. The first is that we do 
not have data on individual consumption (and hence saving) so we can only follow 
households, whose cohort is defined by the date of birth of the household head. Hence, 
we face problems of household dissolution and reformation, where, for example, older 
people go to live with their children, so that previously “old” households become 
“young” households in subsequent years. There is no practical way to deal with this 
problem, given the nature of the data at hand, but we do attempt some sensitivity 
analyses based on “individual” measures of saving.  
 
The second problem is that the assumption that the membership of the cohort is fixed 
may sometimes be hard to maintain. For example, if mortality and wealth are 
negatively related, cohort averages will reflect the fact that the population from which 
the samples are drawn becomes progressively richer as the poorer individuals die 
younger (Attanasio and Banks, 1998). This second problem is related to the first, 
                                                                                                                                               
cohorts. If there are strong cohort effects, a cross-section age profile may be very different from the age 
profile of any individual, as noted by Shorrocks (1975). 
11 We do not observe the behaviour of the currently middle aged when they were young, nor the currently 
old when they were middle aged. As Attanasio (1998) points out, when extrapolating the lifecycle profile 
of each cohort for the ages at which it is not observed, it is necessary to use the information on the 
behaviour of other cohorts to impose some structure on the data. 
12 Verbeek and Nijman (1992) note that by treating averages of cohorts as if they were from genuine 
panel data may result in inconsistent estimates if the unobservable individual fixed effects are correlated 
with the explanatory variables. However provided that the true means in each cohort exhibit sufficient 
time variation and the cohort sizes are sufficiently large (they suggest 100 to 200) then the bias arising 
from ignoring this errors-in-variables problem is likely to be quite small. 
   12
because rather than dying, the poorer elderly also may be absorbed into younger 
households. We attempt to deal with this problem by restricting the maximum age in 
our sample to 74 years, although the possibility that wealth-related mortality has begun 
earlier than this age cannot be discounted. 
 
The third problem is that the overall sample size of the HES (approximately 3500 
households per year) means that many of the cell averages would represent rather 
small samples if they are formed from the interaction of each birth-year with each 
survey year. These small cell sizes may impair the precision of any estimates formed 
using the synthetic panel techniques. We respond to this sample size problem by using 
two types of cohorts: single birth years, for each year between 1910 and 1979, and 
five-year birth intervals. The narrower, one-year, cohort definition will reduce the 
amount of heterogeneity within each cell but at the cost of increased imprecision. By 
using both types of cohorts, we may gain some sense of the robustness of our results. 
 
Table 3.1 contains details of the five-year birth-interval  cohorts, including the birth 
years, the ages observed and the average cell size. Some of the earliest and latest 
born cohorts are tracked across fewer of the survey years because otherwise the age 
of these household heads would fall outside the range 19-74 years during the 1984-98 
period.
13 The table also contains estimates of the average saving-to-consumption ratio 
for each cohort, the same ratios calculated at the median, 25
th and 75
th percentiles and 
the ratio of average savings to average consumption.
14 C omparing these averages 
across cohorts, saving rates appear to fall, then rise and then fall again when moving 
from the earliest born to the latest born cohorts. However, it is clear that this pattern 
combines both age and birth cohort effects because the ages over which household 
heads are observed also vary when moving from one cohort to another. 
 
One way to hold age constant so that any cohort effect can be observed is to focus on 
the ages where adjacent cohorts overlap. To do this, each cohort’s ‘age’ is based on 
the median year of birth within the five-year birth interval.
15 Because the cohorts are 
defined by a five-year interval and we have 15 years of data, each cohort potentially 
overlaps at ten ages with the next one. For example, Cohort 6 (born in 1935-39) is 
observed between (median) ages 47 and 61, while Cohort 7 (born in 1940-44) is 




Table 3.2 contains estimates of the mean and median saving rate for each pair of 
adjacent cohorts, averaged over the ages in which the two cohorts overlap. For both 
the mean and the median, the first four rows of the table, corresponding to households 
whose heads are born between 1910 and 1934, show a negative cohort effect. Each 
later born cohort has a lower average saving rate than the earlier born cohort had at 
the same age. This pattern is reversed when moving from Cohort 5 (household heads 
born in 1930-34) through to Cohort 11 (born in 1960-64) as each later born cohort has 
a higher average saving rate than did the earlier born cohort at the same age. This 
                                                 
13 Specifically, Cohorts 1-3 and 12-14 with birth years 1910-24 and 1965-79. 
14 Attanasio (1998) points out that it may be easier to work with the ratio of averages rather than the 
average of ratios when constructing counterfactual experiments that link the saving rates of cohorts to the 
aggregate saving rate. 
15 For example, for Cohort 1, where household heads are born between 1910-14, we treat the year of birth 
as 1912. 
16 However, the earliest and latest born cohorts are observed for fewer years and hence have fewer years 
of overlap.   13
preliminary view of the raw data suggests that there may well be an important cohort 
pattern on saving among New Zealand households. However, more formal methods 
are needed to see if these cohort effects persist and are statistically significant once a 
greater lifecycle age structure is imposed on the data, and allowance is made for other 
conditioning variables. 
 
In addition to comparing the average saving rates across cohorts, we can also track the 
saving rate for each cohort across successive survey years. To do this, each cohort’s 
‘age’ is once again based on the median year of birth within the five-year birth interval. 
Figure 3.1 plots these saving rates against age for each cohort, with the mean saving 
rate in the top panel and the median saving rate in the bottom panel. To give an 
example of how these cohorts are tracked, for Cohort 6 who had a median age of 47 in 
1984, the 1984 survey was used to calculate the average saving rate for all households 
whose head was born in 1935-39 and the result is plotted as the first point on the line 
marked “6” (with a median saving rate of 0.17). The rest of the line comes from the 
other surveys, tracking those households whose head was born in 1935-39 until they 
are last observed at (median) age 61 in the 1998 survey (with a median saving rate of 
0.33). 
 
The immediate impression from both the mean and median saving rates in Figure 3.1 
is the substantial amount of noise in the estimated average saving rates. Because each 
point is a summary statistic for cells that themselves hold an average of 250 
households, the great variability in saving behaviour across households is apparent. 
But even with the noise, there is somewhat of a “hump” shape in these graphs, with 
average saving rates being highest from the mid-40’s until household heads reach their 
60’s. Any decline in saving rates after the peak saving years is more apparent at the 
median than the mean.  The cohort effects can also be seen from the variation in 
saving rates for different cohorts at the same age (i.e., by taking a vertical section 
anywhere through Figure 3.1). 
 
4  UNRESTRICTED ESTIMAT ES OF AGE AND COHORT EFFECTS 
4.1  Introduction 
According to the lifecycle model, a person saves at one stage of his or her life to 
consume in another period. Therefore, saving behaviour should differ for different 
individuals at different stages of their lifecycles and may also evolve over time and 
across (birth-year) cohorts as economies grow and as certain fluctuations affect 
individuals contemporaneously. However, as noted in Section  1, without the aid of 
some identifying structure, it is impossible to distinguish the separate effects of age, 
cohort and time when using data observed over different age intervals for different birth 
cohorts. Of course, a possible limitation that arises from this need for an identifying 
structure, is that the resulting estimates simply reflect the assumptions chosen. 
 
In this section we use a relatively unrestricted approach to estimating age and cohort 
effects, based on methods outlined by Paxson (1996) and Deaton (1997). Because 
there is no attempt to estimate time effects (i.e., year of observation), we do not need 
to impose a full identifying structure. Hence, the results in this section can serve as a 
cross-check for those derived from the more structured approaches used in the 
following sections.  
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Three other features of the approach used in this section are notable. First, it is based 
on cell means (or quantiles) rather than individual observations,
17 so this averaging 
may reduce the impact of outliers and measurement error. Second, the approach 
allows us to examine age and cohort effects in saving rates jointly with the age and 
cohort effects in household income and consumption. This is useful because in our 
data saving is derived as a residual, so it may be informative to view patterns in the 
original data series, particularly given interest in shifting patterns of income and 
consumption in New Zealand (Borland, 2000). Third, we focus on households rather 
than on the individuals who are the decision-making units in theoretical treatments of 
saving behaviour. We also use the age and birth year of the household head to 
determine what cohort the household belongs to and at what point in its lifecycle it has 
been observed. To the best of our knowledge, this use of households rather than 
individuals is common to all but two studies of age and cohort effects in saving 
behaviour.
18 Our approach can be justified by the fact that many consumption and 
saving choices are taken at household level (Attanasio, 1998) and it avoids the 
difficulty of imputing individual-level measures from household-level data. On the other 
hand, households may contain members who are at different stages in their lifecycles, 
so the age of the head may not be a good guide to the saving plans and behaviour of 
all members. Therefore, we do report some sensitivity analyses that are based on an 
individual version of an empirical lifecycle model, following the lead of Deaton and 
Paxson (2000).  
 
4.2  Method 
 
In the standard lifecycle model without uncertainty, an individual’s consumption level is 
proportional to lifetime wealth  – comprised of assets at birth and the discounted 
present value of expected future earnings – with a factor of proportionality that depends 
on age and the real interest rate. Ignoring the effect of interest rates, for individual i 
who is observed in year t and was born in year b, 
 
( ) ) 1 . 4 ( ib i ibt W b t g c - =  
 
where c is consumption and W is wealth, and noting that age,  . b t a - =  Adapting the 
model to households, lifetime resources are assumed to be set at the time of 
household formation and the task is to allocate consumption over time, according to the 
household’s preferences as represented by the function  g. If we take logarithms of 
equation (4.1) and then average over all households whose head is in the cohort born 
at time b and observed at t, we obtain 
                                                 
17 These cells are formed from the interaction of survey year and year of birth (of the household head). 
18 Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus (1996) use cross-sectional profiles and population data to distribute 
aggregate data into cells defined by individual’s age and sex. This required them to allocate total income 
earned by married couples evenly between the husband and the wife and to allocate household 
consumption amongst adults (after equivalising children’s consumption and reallocating it to the co-
resident parents) using a combination of commodity-specific sharing rules and simple equal-per-adult 
allocations. The burgeoning literature on the lack of pooling of household resources (see, for example, 
Haddad, 1999) makes these assumptions appear questionable. Deaton and Paxson (2000) retrieve 
‘individual’ consumption (income) by regressing household consumption (income) levels on the numbers 
of people in the household in each age from 0 to 99 and then apply the age and cohort decomposition 
described by equation (4.5). However, this approach assumes that people living together consume, earn 
and save in the same way that they would if living apart, which ignores issues such as economies of scale 
in household consumption.   15
 
( ) ) 2 . 4 ( ln ln ln b bt W b t g c + - =  
 
so that average consumption is the sum of two components, one of which depends 
only on age and one of which depends only on birth-year cohort.  
 
To estimate equation (4.2), the sample average of the logarithm of consumption for 
each cohort in each survey year can be regressed on a set of age and cohort dummy 
variables. However, Deaton (1997, p.346) suggests also including in the regression the 
average number of adults and children per household in each cohort·year cell to make 
allowance for the differential consumption requirements of adults and children. These 
family composition effects can be thought of as an argument of the preference function 
g in equation (4.1). We follow this approach, but distinguish the number of prime age 
adults, n
a from the number of elderly adults, n
e (with the number of children denoted 
n
c).
19 Therefore, the equation to be estimated is: 
 















 is a matrix of age dummies, D
b is a matrix of cohort (year of birth) dummies, 
the coefficients ac and gc are the age and cohort effects in consumption, the d’s control 
for the effect of demographic composition and uc is the error surrounding the sample 
estimate of average log consumption for households with heads born in year b and 
observed in year t. In addition to decomposing the mean of ln cbt into age and cohort 
effects, the approach in equation (4.3) can be used for quantiles, and in our empirical 
application we apply the method to the cell median and the 25
th and the 75
th percentile 
of (log) household consumption.
20  
 
In the same way that a time series of cross-sectional household surveys allows us to 
track the average consumption for different birth cohorts over time, so too does it allow 
us to track the average income of those cohorts over time. The underlying relationship, 
corresponding to equation (4.1), is that income at any age can be expressed 
proportional to lifetime resources, where the factor of proportionality depends on age 
(Deaton and Paxson, 2000). Hence, we can empirically estimate a counterpart to 
equation (4.3) but this time for log household incomes, where again they are attributed 
to cohorts based on the year of birth of the head: 
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The difference between the logarithm of income and the logarithm of consumption is a 
monotone increasing function of both the saving-to-income and the  saving-to-
consumption ratios and obeys the inequality:
21 
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19 The transition from child to adult is assumed to occur at age 15, and from adult to elderly at age 65. 
20 All cell averages and quantiles formed for those households with a head born in b and observed in t are 
weighted by the household sampling weights recorded in the HES datafiles. 
21 As the saving rate rises, the difference between log income and log consumption gives a closer 
approximation to the savings-to-income rate than to the savings-to-consumption ratio.   16
When the savings ratio is low, the difference between log income and log consumption 
is approximately equal to (either) savings ratio, so the cohort-age decomposition of log 
consumption and log income automatically gives a cohort-age decomposition of the 
savings ratio (Deaton, 1997). Subtracting equation (4.3) from (4.4) and ignoring the 
demographic variables gives:  
 
( ) ( ) ) 5 . 4 ( ln ln c y c y
b
c y
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where  ) ( c y a a -  is the estimated age effect in the saving rate and  ) ( c y g g -  is the 
estimated cohort effect. 
 
This age-cohort decomposition of log consumption and log income is based on 
samples with 840 observations, where those observations are themselves cell 
averages (or quantiles). These cells are formed by the interaction of 15 survey years 
(1984-1998) and birth-year cohorts that ranged from 1910 to 1979. Note however that 
the cohorts at either end of the range do not appear in all 15 surveys because the 
sample is restricted to households whose head was between the ages of 19-74 at the 
time of the survey. The smallest number of households used to construct a cohort·year 
cell is 11 (for 19-year-olds in 1987), while the median cell size is 53.
22 The March 
quarter CPI was used to convert all monetary values to December 1993 prices, prior to 
forming the cell averages of household incomes and consumption. 
 
4.3  Results 
Figure 4.1 shows the estimated age effects in consumption and income for the mean, 
median, and 25
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution of households within cells. The 
average of current consumption expenditure appears to peak by the time household 
heads have reached age 40, while the age profile of average household income is 
everywhere higher and appears to peak somewhat later, although there is some 
variability in the graph.
23 Consequently, the saving rate (shown by the graph with a bold 
line and using the scale on the right-hand side), peaks in the decade after the 
household head reaches age 50 and then declines somewhat in the 60’s but still 
remains well above zero. This apparent lack of dissaving amongst households headed 
by the elderly has been widely remarked upon in the literature, with most explanations 
focussing on bequest motives or differential mortality (Johnson and Stears, 1998; 
Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000), whereby the poor  – who are likely to have low or 
negative saving rates – die earlier than the rich and so cease to be a downward drag 
on the average. When using household data, another form of “mortality” is also 
relevant; those households who have consumed all of their resources may be 
absorbed into other households (e.g., elderly parents moving in with children). 
 
The age effects in median consumption, income and saving rates appear to be more 
favourable to the lifecycle hypothesis, with dissaving apparent at both young and old 
age. The ‘hump’ in savings for the decade beginning about age 50 is also more 
apparent, with saving rates rising by about ten percentage points, which is equivalent 
                                                 
22 Paxson (1996) carries out a similar analysis where the smallest cell size is only five households, 
although her median cell sizes are approximately 200. 
23 Each point on the income and consumption graphs corresponds to a coefficient from a regression. We 
have not applied any smoothing to these points and we do not show the standard error that surrounds each 
point. However, the age and cohort effects are both jointly statistically significant (see Appendix Table 
A).   17
to one-third of the amplitude shown over the lifecycle. It appears that as household 
heads advance past age 60 median household incomes fall more rapidly than do mean 
incomes and it is this, rather than differences in the age profiles of consumption at the 
mean and the median, which causes the differences in the age-saving profiles. 
 
The bottom two panels of Figure 4.1 show the age profiles at the lower and upper end 
of the distribution. At any age, the income of household at the 25
th percentile of the 
within-cell distribution is less than the current consumption expenditure of the 
household at the 25
th percentile of the expenditure distribution (i.e., there is apparent 
dissaving), while the reverse pattern holds at the 75
th percentile. This pattern may 
simply reflect the greater dispersion of household incomes compared to consumption. 
Regardless of the cause, it is apparent that age-related attrition amongst households at 
the lower end of the income and consumption distributions will tend to raise the mean 
saving rate. The ‘hump’ in savings is less apparent amongst the richer households, 
with a near-linear trend in the savings rate from age 25 to age 55. The drop in saving 
rates after age 60 is also less marked for these rich households.  
 
The cohort effects are shown in Figure 4.2, where cohorts are relabelled according to 
their age in the first year of the survey (1984), so older cohorts are further to the right. 
There is considerable year-to-year variability in these cohort graphs, but the cohort 
effect in mean, median and 25
th percentile consumption appears to be rising slightly 
with age in 1984. In other words, at any given age, the real consumption level of 
households whose head comes from an earlier birth year is somewhat higher than the 
consumption level of the more recent cohorts. In contrast, there is no overall trend in 
the cohort effect for the consumption of rich households, with both younger and older 
cohorts appearing to have higher consumption than the cohorts whose household head 
was middle-aged in 1984. These cohort effects in real consumption may be consistent 
with the reports (see, for example, Stephens et al., 2000) that living standards for many 
households in the middle and bottom of the distribution may have been stagnant or 
even declining since the period of economic reforms beginning around 1984.
24  
 
The cohort effects in mean and median household income also rise slightly with age at 
time of the first survey, so, for example, a household headed by someone in their 20’s 
in 1984 has real income that appears about two percent lower than a household in its 
20’s had 40 years before.
25 But much more apparent than this slight trend is the ‘dip’ in 
average household incomes for those households headed by someone born between 
ca. 1930-1945. For example, a household headed by a 49-year old in 1984 has income 
that is about 12 percent lower than the income of a 49-year old household 11 years 
later, in 1995.
26 One possible explanation for this ‘dip’ in incomes is that the household 
heads aged ca. 40-55 were especially vulnerable to the effects of New Zealand’s 
economic restructuring from 1984 onwards. Just as this group would expect to be in 
their peak earning years, they instead faced a decade of unprecedently high 
unemployment. By the time recovery came, many of these people may have been too 
                                                 
24 This claim also relies upon the CPI being the correct measure for putting the consumption standard of 
living observed in different survey years onto a consistent basis. To the extent that there is unmeasured 
quality change, living standards of younger cohorts may in fact exceed those of older cohorts, but this is 
not a topic that we consider further. Moreover, there is a significant downward trend in household size 
across the survey years, so the trend in living standards for individuals may not be the same as the trend in 
living standards for households. 
25 A household whose head was in their 20’s, 40 years earlier would be in its 60’s at the time of the first 
survey. 
26 This is the gap from the income graph in the first panel of Figure 4.2 between ca. 9.3 on the log scale 
for a 38-year old in 1984 and 9.2 on the log scale for a 49-year old.   18
old to be re-employed, so they may have suffered a permanent fall in their lifetime 
incomes. But if this is the explanation for the cohort effects in average income, it is 
puzzling that the dip for those born ca. 1930-1945 is much more apparent for rich 
households than the poor (see the bottom panels of Figure 4.2). Most accounts of New 
Zealand’s economic restructuring suggest that it has been the poor who have borne the 
brunt, so one would expect to see the fall in incomes for the 1930-1945 cohorts to be 
more apparent at the 25




One reason that the dip in household incomes for cohorts born ca. 1930-45 is so 
noticeable at the 75
th percentile of the income distribution is that for these rich 
households, later-born cohorts have higher real incomes than other households. This 
pattern of the latter-born having greater lifetime resources is the ‘usual’ one in the 
presence of economic growth (see, for example, results for four countries reported by 
Paxson (1996)). In contrast, the cohort effect in income at the 25
th percentile is the 
opposite of what economic growth would be expected to bring; age-income profiles 
appear to have declined sharply when moving from older to younger cohorts, with this 
downwards shift occurring at a faster rate than for the age-consumption profiles. 
 
The combination of little change in average consumption across cohorts and a dip in 
the average incomes of certain birth-year cohorts produces a noticeable cohort effect in 
the saving rate
28. Both younger and older cohorts have higher average household 
saving rates than do those households whose head was between 40 and 60 years old 
in 1984. The fall in the saving rates for households with heads in this age range is 
about 10 percentage points at the mean and median and about 15 percentage points at 
the 75
th percentile. The pattern of cohort effects at the 75
th percentile is almost ‘V’ 
shaped, so it is possible that downward trends in aggregate saving rates might be 
temporary; older cohorts with higher saving rates have been replaced by middle-aged 
cohorts with low saving rates, but those middle-aged will, in turn, be replaced by 
younger cohorts with high saving rates.  
 
In summary, this relatively unrestricted approach to decomposing income, consumption 
and saving rates into age and cohort effects has suggested the following: Consumption 
largely tracks income over the lifecycle but appears to peak earlier. Consequently there 
is somewhat of a ‘hump’ in saving rates for households whose head is between 50-60 
years old. This ‘hump’ pattern (which, along with dissaving by the elderly is consistent 
with predictions of the lifecycle model) is especially apparent when using cell medians. 
There is a slight linear trend in consumption and income across cohorts, with the later 
born appearing to have lower lifetime wealth but the more noticeable effect is the 
decline in incomes for those cohorts aged ca. 40-55 in 1984. This produces a 
corresponding fall in saving rates for these cohorts.  
 
                                                 
27 Future work could examine the effect that industry affliation has on the cohort patterns found here. The 
reform of the NZ economy was uneven across industries in both its intensity and its sequencing, so we 
cannot rule out that possibility that the stronger cohort patterns found at the 75th percentile just reflect the 
attachment to certain industries by that group of households. Note, however, that the test of this 
hypothesis would require data on industry affiliation at the time of the reforms, whereas we can only 
obtain industry affiliation at the time of the survey". 
28 It is possible that the discrepancy between the timing of income and expenditures in the survey affects 
some types of households more than others, and that these households tend to be richer. One way to test 
whether our cohort patterns reflect this timing, and possibly seasonal influences, might be to control for 
the month that the household was observed (although the sample is staggered evenly throughout the year). 
Again, we leave that for future work.  
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The results reported below will test whether this cohort effect persists when more 
structured approaches are used to estimate year effects along with age and cohort 
effects. But before that, some disaggregated results for population sub-groups will be 
presented, because some explanations for falling aggregate saving rates revolve 
around changes in the population composition. We also present some sensitivity 
analyses to see whether the age and cohort patterns reported here are also present 
when the unit of analysis shifts from households to individuals. 
 
4.4  Results for Population Sub-groups  
The age and cohort effects in (log) income and consumption and in the derived saving 
rate for male-headed and female-headed households are plotted in Figure 4.3. These 
graphs are based on the decomposition of cell medians and so can be compared with 
the full-sample estimates in the upper right-hand panel of Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Female-
headed households have lower saving rates over their lifecycle and they exhibit a much 
less pronounced rise than do male saving rates in the 40-60 years-old range. The age-
profile of consumption appears to more closely track the age-profile of income for 
female-headed households whereas male-headed households appear to be able to 
detach their consumption from their income, at least between their early 40’s and late 
50’s. The other interesting feature of the age profiles is the rise in the saving rate when 
a male head advances through his 60’s and 70’s; this rise is less apparent in the 
aggregate results. One reason may be the greater life expectancy of females, which 
causes a rising proportion of female-headed households amongst the elderly;
29 
because these households have a lower saving rate this causes the overall saving rate 
for the elderly to fall. 
 
The cohort graphs in the bottom panels of Figure 4.3 show that the lower saving rate 
for those households headed by someone who was ca. 45-55 in 1984 is a feature for 
both male- and female-headed households. There i s also a strong cohort effect in 
income for households headed by women, but not for households headed by a man. 
For example, a household headed by a women in her 30’s in 1984 has real income that 
is about 25 percent higher than a household headed by a women in her 30’s had 20 
years before (i.e., a household headed by a women in her 50’s in 1984). 
 
Figure 4.4 plots the age and cohort effects in income, consumption and saving rates 
according to the ethnicity of the household head, using a simple split of the sample into 
Maori or Pacific Islander and all other ethnic groups (predominantly European/Pakeha). 
For the Maori and Pacific Islander-headed households, the age profile of consumption 
appears to track the age profile of income so saving rates do not appear to exhibit 
hump-shaped patterns over the lifecycle. It is however difficult to observe the 
underlying patterns because of the high year-on-year variability and this problem of 
noise in the data is even more apparent in the graphs of the cohort effects. Hence, a 
more structured approach may be needed to studying the effect of ethnicity on saving 
rates (e.g., restricting the effects of ethnicity to the intercepts rather than the slopes of 
age-saving profiles).  
 
The age and cohort decompositions can also be carried out with other population sub-
groups, such as employed household heads compared with those who are unemployed 
or out of the labour force. However, these other variables that can be used to 
disaggregate the sample are likely to vary over the life cycle, which raises doubts about 
                                                 
29 In the 55-64 year-old group, 65 percent of household heads are male, but in the 65-74 year-old group 
only 56 percent of household heads are male.   20
the appropriateness of the sampling assumption that is made when comparing people 
of different ages observed in different survey years. Possibly for this reason, statistical 
tests of whether age and cohort effects are (jointly) zero are often not rejected when 
the decomposition is applied to these sub-samples (Appendix Table A). 
 
4.5  Sensitivity Analyses Using “Individual” Saving Rates 
The available data force us to use households as the unit of analysis rather than the 
individuals who are the decision-makers in theoretical treatments of saving behaviour. 
The age of the household head is also used to determine the stage in the lifecycle for 
the household, even though there may be active savers within the household who are 
at different lifecycle stages. If there is some relationship between savings (or wealth) 
and being a household head, then working with the head’s age rather than the 
individual’s age may bias the estimated age profile of saving rates. For example, if low 
savers amongst the elderly move in with their children once they have exhausted their 
financial resources, while high savers continue as household heads, the age profile of 
saving will not decline with age in a way that reflects the average behaviour of the 
elderly (Deaton and Paxson, 2000). 
 
There are enormous difficulties in retrieving estimates of individual income, 
consumption and savings from the household data that we have available. However, 
treating the results just as a sensitivity analysis, we can at least follow the example of 
Deaton and Paxson (2000) in estimating an individual version of an empirical lifecycle 
model. The key assumption of this approach is that households are simply a veil for the 
individuals within them, with no effect on anyone’s income, consumption, or savings. 
Household consumption is simply the sum of individual consumption, so the following 
regression can be estimated for a single cross-section from year t: 
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where cht is the observed consumption of household h in time t, and naht is the number 
of people aged a in household h at time t. More specifically, the b’s are recovered from 
a cross-sectional regression of household consumption levels on the numbers of 
people in the household in each age from 0 to 99,  and serve as estimates of 
“individual” consumption. A similar approach can be used to measure “individual” 
income. Although these are extreme assumptions, ignoring economies of scale and the 
division of labour between market and household production, they at least allow the 
‘sharing rules’ for income and consumption to be derived from the data rather than from 
assumptions (compare with Gokhale et. al., 1996). 
 
Figure 4.5 plots the b’s for each of the 15 survey years. In addition to the negative 
values below age 20 and above age 75, it is also apparent that this regression 
procedure produces substantial noise for the older ages, where the number of 
observations are small (or missing).
30  
 
                                                 
30 With 15 survey years and 20 ages above 79, we should have 300 coefficients for the 80-99 year-olds in 
each regression but we only have 146 due to some survey years having no one of each particular age in 
the 80-99 range.   21
The individuals within households are assumed to each follow their own lifecycle 
trajectory, in which both consumption and income at each age is the product of an age 
effect and a lifecycle wealth effect. Hence, we can write a counterpart to equation (4.1): 
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where  t-a gives the year of birth. These measures of individual consumption (and 
income) can be decomposed into age effects and cohort (wealth) effects. As Deaton 
and Paxson (2000, p.220) point out, provided that the  b’s are positive, this 
decomposition can be performed by pooling the b’s estimated from all of the survey 
years, taking logarithms and regressing on a set of age and cohort dummies. This 
corresponds to using equations (4.3) and (4.4), which is the first and only stage when 
working with household-level data, because the  b’s serve as an estimate of the 
average consumption (or income) for people of age a, observed in year t. 
 
The major practical problem, however, is that the regression in equation (4.6) does not 
always result in positive values for the b’s, especially for those at very young and very 
old ages. Consequently, the decomposition using equations (4.3) and (4.4) is not 
possible because the logarithm of negative values is undefined.  
 
Deaton and Paxson use an iterative matrix procedure to deal with the problem of 
negative estimates  of individual income and consumption. They start with  bat  
estimates, similar to those reported in Figure 4.5, but with the income coefficients 
constrained to be zero for ages 80 and above. The negative values are set equal to 
one (so that logs can be taken) and the equation (4.4) decomposition is carried out to 
get initial estimates of age and cohort effects. These are then used in several iterations 
to produce a full set of cohorts effects for all ages observed by the survey. In principle, 
the vectors of cohort and age effects can then be estimated by minimizing the sum 
over all cohorts and ages of the squared residuals between the b’s and the product of 
the age and cohort effects. This is equivalent to extracting an eigenvector from the 
squared matrix of age and cohort effects. However, in their empirical application they 
are forced to impose the restriction that the cohort effects in income and consumption 
are identical, so no cohort effects in saving rates can be measured. 
 
We use a simpler approach to e nsuring non-negativity of the estimated  b’s for 
individual consumption and income. This approach also has the advantage of allowing 
us to obtain cohort effects in individual saving rates. By using non-linear least squares 
to estimate equation (4.6), but with the b’s squared, we implicitly find the set of age-
specific individual consumptions that minimise the residual sum of squares subject to 
the constraint that they be non-negative. For example, if we write a fragment of 
equation (4.6): 
 
ht ht ht ht ht ht v n n c + + + + = K K 20 20 19 19 b b  
 
what we estimate is: 
 
( ) ( ) ht ht ht ht ht ht ht ht v n n c + + ￿ + ￿ + = K K 20 20 20 19 19 19 b b b b  
 
so that regardless of whether the estimates produced by the non-linear least squares 
algorithm, say,  ht 20 ˆ b , are positive or negative, they must be squared (and hence,   22
become positive) in order to restore the underlying linear regression in equation (4.6).
31 
We also impose some further structure, by requiring the b’s to be equal within the 
following age groups: 0-4, 5 -9, 10-14, 15-19 and 80-99 years. This helps with the 
convergence of the non-linear least squares algorithm and should not affect our results, 
because we focus on the saving behaviour of individuals between ages 20-75. 
 
Figure 4.6 plots the derived saving rates (more precisely, the difference between the 
logarithms of income a nd consumption) for individuals and households.
32 The age 
profiles for the individual saving rates are considerably more hump-shaped than are the 
profiles using the household data and the age of the household head. This follows from 
the fact that both approaches should have the same mean saving rate (under the 
assumption that households have no effect on anyone’s income or consumption) but 
the individual approach allows greater dissaving amongst the young and the old. 
Deaton and Paxson (2000) also find that the individual approach gives age profiles that 
are more in accord with the lifecycle hypothesis. Although the individual approach 
shows a greater rise in the saving rate, from approximately age 40 onwards, once the 
age effects are rescaled (the bottom panels of Figure 4.6) the age patterns are similar 
except in the retirement phase. The household-level saving rate rises as the household 
head’s age rises from the early 60s to the mid 70’s while the individual saving rate 
declines. This discrepancy may reflect the tendency of the less wealthy elderly to be 
absorbed into younger households (e.g., their children) where the economically active 
adults are building up their savings.  
 
The cohort effects in the individual and household saving rates follow the same pattern 
as the age effects, in the sense that using the individual approach uncovers much 
greater variability. But once the cohort effects are rescaled, in the bottom panel of 
Figure 4.6, a similar group emerges as having the lowest saving rates. This group is 
comprised of those who were aged between ca. 45 and 60 years in 1984 (or 
equivalent, were born in ca. 1924-39). Hence, using the available methods for deriving 
individual saving rates, shows that the pattern of cohort effects discovered in the 
household data also is reproduced in the individual data. 
 
5  INTRODUCING THE YEAR EFFECTS 
5.1  Methods 
In this section we introduce controls for time (i.e., survey year) that reflect the fact that 
saving behaviour may change over time as various macroeconomic fluctuations affect 
individuals contemporaneously. A straight-forward extension to the model would be to 
simply add a set of survey-year fixed effects, D
a+b
 (a+b=t, t+1, .., T, where t and T are 
the first and last available cross-sections): 
 
) 1 . 5 ( u D D D x s
b a b a + + + =
+ d g a
 
where  D
a and  D
b are the age and birth year dummies as before. However, the 
superscripts highlight the fact that the year in which each household is observed equals 
the age of the household head, a plus their year of birth, b. The separate effect of a, b, 
and a+b therefore cannot be identified in equation (5.1) and any trends in the data can 
                                                 
31 This approach to imposing inequality restrictions is noted by White (1993, p.107). 
32 The household estimates are obtained directly from Figure 4.1.   23
be arbitrarily attributed to year effects, or a combination of age and cohort effects 
(Deaton and Paxson, 1994).  
 
On the other hand, if the year effects are dropped from the model it rules out any 
uncertainty, such as due to macroeconomic shocks that surprise all members of a 
cohort. A less extreme assumption than dropping the year effects is to include them but 
in a normalised form so that they sum to zero and are orthogonal to a time trend: 
 




















This is equivalent to assuming that all trends in the data can be interpreted as a 
combination of age and cohort effects and are therefore, by definition, predictable. The 
time effects then reflect additive  macroeconomic shocks or the residual influence of 
non-systematic measurement error (Jappelli, 1999).  
 
We introduce these constrained year effects into an age-cohort decomposition of 
household saving rates that is based on the sample of 840 cell averages that were 
used in Section 4. Unlike the previous section, we examine the ratio of household 
saving to consumption directly rather than studying the age, cohort and time patterns in 
income and consumption. However, we continue our previous modelling methods, of 
dating the household by the age and birth year of the head and studying the patterns at 
cell means, medians and 25
th and 75
th percentiles of the saving rate. 
 
5.2  Results 
Figure 5.1 plots the age, cohort, and survey-year effects in mean saving rates. The 
panel at the bottom right-hand side of the graph shows that all three effects are 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Comparing Figure 5.1 with the saving rate 
graph from Figure 4.1 shows that the addition of the time effects does not alter the 
basic shape of the age-profile of saving rates but the cohort effect becomes more 
pronounced. Specifically, the fall in saving rates for those households whose head was 
aged ca. 40-60 in 1984 is more apparent once the time effects are included. These 
time effects are negative in 1984, 1990, and 1994-97 (noting that they are constrained 
to sum to zero across all years), which are not necessarily the years with the lowest 
average saving rates. In fact, there is only a correlation of 0.22 between mean saving 




What macroeconomic variables might explain these time effects, noting that they are 
meant to be capturing additive macroeconomic shocks? Figure 5.2 plots the 
relationship between the time effects and the real growth rate, the government saving 
rate, the unemployment rate, and the real interest rate. The trend lines are shown both 
for the full sample of 15 years and for the sample that excludes 1984, which looks to be 
an outlier on several of the graphs. The only two relationships that are statistically 
significant – both are negative  – are with the real growth rate and with the ratio of 
                                                 
33 This correlation rises to 0.44 if 1984 is excluded, but this is still statistically insignificant (p<0.12).  
One reason for excluding 1984 may be that incomes, and hence saving, was artificially suppressed by the 
wage and price freeze.   24
government saving to GDP. Hence, unpredictable shocks that either raise the r eal 
growth rate or raise the rate of public sector saving appear to reduce the household 
saving rate, holding constant any other macroeconomic influences working via the age 
or cohort effects. 
 
These patterns may conflict with lifecycle explanations, because growth should raise 
mean saving rates by shifting resources toward higher savers, but this a long run effect 
and so may differ from the one plotted in Figure 5.1.
34 There is no significant 
relationship between the time effect in mean saving rates and either the unemployment 
rate,
35 or the real interest rate (nor with the nominal interest rate nor the inflation rate, 
neither of which relationship is plotted). 
 
The age, cohort and time effects in the median saving rate are similar to the patterns in 
mean saving rates (Figure 5.3). However, there is less variation in saving rates over 
the lifecycle or across cohorts at the median compared with at the mean.  
 
In Figure 5.4 it is apparent that there is even less variation in the age and cohort 
profiles of saving at the 25
th percentile, and the hypothesis that the cohort effects are 
(jointly) zero cannot be rejected ( p<0.24). In contrast, the cohort effects are sharply 
defined at the 75
th percentile, with those households headed by someone who was 
aged ca. 45-60 in 1984 having saving rates that were up to 70 percent lower than the 
saving rates that similarly aged households from the reference group had in earlier 
years (Figure 5.4). This contrast in the cohort patterns, which is consistent with the 
evidence in Figure 4.2, emphasises the diversity amongst households in the patterns of 
saving rates. But despite the dissimilarity of the cohort effects at the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles, the time effects are largely the same, being negative in 1984-85, 1990, 
1994-97. 
 
5.3  Results for Population Sub-Groups 
The age, cohort and time effects in saving rates for male-headed and female-headed 
households are plotted in Figure 5.5. The cohort effect is somewhat less pronounced 
for the female-headed households, but it is still statistically significant. There are also 
some differences in the time effects, which are negative for female-headed households 
in 1997. 
 
Figure 5.6 plots the same decomposition for households headed by Maori or Pacific 
Islanders, compared with households headed by other ethnic groups. Although saving 
rates drift upwards as Maori and Pacific Island household heads age, they show no 
rapid rise from age 40 onwards, in contrast to the somewhat hump-shaped pattern for 
households headed by other ethnic groups. The cohort pattern for the ethnic minority 
groups is also less noticeable, with saving rates just trending downwards with the birth 
year of the household head, but it remains statistically significant. There is also a 
different pattern of time effects across the two groups of households; the year effects 
are not statistically significant for the Maori and Pacific Islands households, so it may 
be true that the saving behaviour of this group of households has been affected rather 
                                                 
34 There is also a negative correlation (-0.12) between the real growth rate and the mean saving rate 
(without control for age or cohort effects), although it is not statistically significant.  
35 Attanasio and Banks (1998) find that saving rates and unemployment rates are positively related in the 
U.K. and suggest that it may reflect the impact of economic uncertainty on precautionary saving by 
households. For the mean saving rate (without control for age or cohort effects) the relationship with 
unemployment rates is positive (0.43) but statistically insignificant (p<0.12).   25
differently by the economic reforms since 1984, although the saw-toothed pattern of 
year effects in Figure 5.6 is hard to interpret. 
 
 
6  THE MODEL USING INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD OBSERVATIONS 
The results in the previous section show that even when further structure is added to 
the model, in the form of the (constrained) year effects, there is still considerable noise 
in both the estimated age profiles of saving rates and the birth-year cohort effects. 
Hence, to see the underlying patterns more clearly, even more structure may be 
needed. One common technique in the literature is to replace the age dummies with a 
fifth-order polynomial in the age of the household head; this appears to smooth out 
much of the noise while still being flexible enough to illustrate the shape of the 
underlying age profile. This approach can also be extended to the cohort dummies, 
replacing them with a fifth-order polynomial in year-of-birth.
36 An alternative approach 
to smoothing out the noise in the cohort effects is to use broader cohorts, such as five-
year intervals of birth-year.
37 
 
In this section we follow the approach of Attanasio (1998) and model the age profile 
with a fifth-order polynomial and the cohort effects with a set of five-year intervals of 
birth-year, which were defined in Table 3.1. To distinguish from the previous approach, 
we replace the index  b for birth-year with  c to indicate the five-year birth cohort. A 
further change is that in contrast to the methods used in the previous two sections, the 
unit of analysis is shifted to individual households, so that we can (eventually) study the 
effects of conditioning variables that may vary within the age/birth-year cells that we 
previously modelled. Hence, our basic model in this section is: 
 








t s  is the saving rate for household h, observed in year t and belonging to (five-
year) birth-cohort c, the function f represents the fifth-order polynomial in the age of the 
household head (
h a ), the coefficient vector  g  captures the effects of the cohort 
intercept dummies, the function d represents the time effects, dt  and 
ch
t u is the residual. 
We continue the assumption made in the previous section, that all the (linear) trends 
observed in the data can be attributed to age and cohort effects, so that time effects 
are orthogonal to a linear trend and average to zero (see equation 5.2).
38 In keeping 
with our previous search for robust patterns in the data, equation 6.1 is estimated on 
mean saving rates and on three quantiles:, the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of the 
distribution of saving-to-expenditure ratios. 
 
6.1  Results for the Basic Model 
Table 6.1 reports the estimates from four regressions on the individual household 
saving rates. The separate intercepts for each five-year birth cohort are reported, along 
with the coefficients on the fifth-order polynomial in the age of the household head. The 
results for the survey year effects are not reported, but follow a similar pattern to that 
                                                 
36 See for example, Jappelli, 1999. 
37 See for example, Attanasio, 1998. 
38 This follows from Deaton (1997), p.126.   26
displayed in Figure 5.1. In all cases we reject the hypotheses that either the year 
effects, the age effects, or the cohort effects are jointly zero.
39 
 
The cohort effects in the mean saving rate are reported in the first column of Table 6.1 
and  follow a somewhat ‘V’ shaped pattern. Relative to the reference group, which is 
households headed by someone born in 1910-14, saving rates fall across later born 
cohorts, reaching their lowest point for households headed by someone from the 1930-
34 birth cohort, where the saving rate is 14 percentage points below the reference 
group. Thereafter, the mean saving rate increases monotonically across the more 
recent cohorts, until it peaks amongst those households headed by someone from the 
1970-74 birth cohort, where it is 28 percentage points above the reference group. This 
pattern is quite similar to that observed in Sections 4 and 5, when using the cell 
averages and single birth year cohorts. In those sections it was observed that younger 
and older cohorts had higher saving rates than did households whose head was 
between 40 and 60 years old in 1984. The current results allow a more precise dating 
of the dip in saving rates, which seems to especially affect those households headed 
by someone born in the 1925-34 period. This result carries the possible implication that 
downward trends in aggregate saving rates might be temporary, as middle-aged 
cohorts with low saving rates will eventually be replaced by younger cohorts with higher 
saving rates. 
 
However, there are fewer grounds for such optimism when considering median saving 
rates, which exhibit the same ‘dip’ for cohorts born ca. 1925-39 but do not show any 
statistically significant rise in saving rates across the more recently born cohorts. It 
appears that the results for mean saving rates are being caused mainly by the 
behaviour of households in the upper end of the distribution; at the 25
th percentile there 
are no significant cohort effects, whereas at the 75
th percentile the ‘V’ shape is 
accentuated. Amongst these households with high saving rates, the results in the final 
column of Table 6.1 show that the saving rate for the 1930-34 birth cohort is 28 percent 
lower than for the 1910-14 cohort. This concentration of the cohort effects at the 75
th 
percentile is also consistent with the results found from cell averages in  Section 4. 
Although the cohort effect appears to be largely restricted to the upper end of the 
distribution, these are the households who contribute the bulk of aggregate saving, so it 
is important to adequately describe and understand these cohort effects if one is to 
make accurate predictions about the future path of aggregate savings. 
 
6.2  Adding Conditioning Variables 
To check whether within-cell heterogeneity can explain the cohort effects that we have 
previously found, the regression models are augmented  with various conditioning 
variables, controlling for demographics, education, employment, family structure and 
dwelling tenure. For example, one possible cause of the cohort effects in Table 6.1 is 
that there are differences in family structure across birth year cohorts due, say, to the 
impact of changing social conditions and welfare policies on the prevalence of sole 
parenthood. By checking to see if the pattern of cohort effects changes when these 
conditioning variables are introduced, we may see if the  shifts in lifecycle saving 
profiles can be explained by these demographic, education and family structure effects.  
 
                                                 
39 It will be apparent from the low value of the R
2 statistics, that saving rates at the level of individual 
households are explained by much more than just age, cohort and year. However our objective is to 
examine age and cohort effects rather than explain the level of household saving.   27
Some of the conditioning variables, such as employment status, are likely to change 
over the lifecycle, whereas others, such as ethnicity and gender, are constant over the 
lifecycle. In both cases, the conditioning variables are allowed to shift the intercept of 
the estimated age profile of saving but because of the small sample sizes we do not 
consider interaction effects where the shape of the age profile can differ between, say, 
education groups. Therefore, the specification of the regression models is: 
 










t s  =  the saving rate for household h, observed in year t and belonging to (five-
year) birth-cohort c;  
ch
t w  = the conditioning variables; and  
ch
t u   =  the residual.  
 
In addition to being a check on the robustness of the cohort effects found previously, 
the coefficients on the conditioning variables in the b  vector may also be of intrinsic 
interest. These coefficients can tell us, for example, whether there are significant 
differences in saving rates between male and female headed households of the same 
age and from the same birth cohort. We also check to see whether the results change 
when based on the characteristics of the household head compared with when they are 
based on the proportion of household members having the characteristic (e.g., we use, 
alternatively, as a conditioning variable, a dummy variable for whether the household 
head is of Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity, and a variable that records the proportion of 
household members who are of Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity). 
 
Table 6.2 contains the results of several models that add increasingly broader sets of 
conditioning variables. All of the specifications include, along with the variables 
reported in the table, a fifth order polynomial in age and a set of survey year variables 
constrained to sum to zero and to be orthogonal to a linear trend. The model in the first 
column of Table 6.2 includes the gender and ethnicity of the household head, which 
can both be considered fixed over the lifecycle. There is a strong effect of gender, with 
male-headed households having saving rates approximately nine percentage points 
higher, but there is no apparent effect of ethnicity on savings. The addition of these 
demographic controls does not change the basic pattern of cohort intercepts, with 
households whose head was born ca. 1925-1939 having lower than average saving 
rates, while the rise in saving rates for the more recently born cohorts is more apparent 
than when the demographic controls were absent. 
 
In column (ii) of Table 6.2, the model includes variables for whether the household 
head is either employed or unemployed, and another variable for whether the head 
receives self-employment income. In comparison with the reference category, which is 
households whose head is out of the labour force, average saving rates are seven 
percent lower if the head is unemployed and 17 percent higher if the head is working. 
The saving rate appears about 13 percent higher when the household head receives 
self-employment income. The difference in income levels between the self-employed 
and other households may be too small to explain this large jump in saving rates,
40 so it 
                                                 
40 Using all 15 surveys from 1984-98, the average disposable income of households headed by someone 
receiving self-employment income was $41,900 (in December 1993 prices), while the average for other 
households where the head is employed is $39,600.   28
may be evidence for theoretical arguments that uninsurable income risk, which is likely 
to be greater for the self-employed, raises the level of wealth accumulation (Caballero, 
1991).  
 
The addition of these three employment variables reinforces the basic cohort pattern in 
saving rates that is reported in Table 6.1, with higher saving rates amongst the later 
born cohorts and lower saving rates amongst the households whose head was born ca. 
1920-1939. Adding the employment variables also affects the results for the other 
demographic controls, halving the coefficient on gender and producing a significantly 
positive coefficient on ethnicity. Hence, the lower saving rates of female-headed 
households are partly because of their lower employment rates, while households 
headed by Maori and Pacific Islanders would have higher than average saving rates if 
their household heads had employment probabilities that were the same as the rest of 
the population. 
 
Adding variables that measure family type and dwelling tenure to the model does not 
cause much change in the pattern of the cohort effects (column (iii), Table 6.2). 
However, the family type and tenure variables, which all have strong life cycle 
patterns,
41 turn out to be significant determinants of saving rates. Sole parents and 
couples with children have saving rates that are at least ten percentage points lower 
than for the reference group comprised of single adults, couples without children and 
mixed and non-family households. Amongst the families with children, the saving rate 
of those households where there is just a sole-parent is four percentage points lower 
than the saving rate of couples with children (p<0.01). Hence, the rise over time in the 
proportion of sole parent households might be expected to depress the aggregate 
saving rate. 
 
In comparison with the reference group who live in rented dwellings, saving rates are 
higher for households paying a mortgage on their own dwelling and are especially 
higher if the mortgage has been repaid on the dwelling (and if it is rent-free, which is 
the tenure type for about three percent of households). The coefficients of the model in 
column (iii) imply a 25 percent higher saving rate for a household that has repaid its 
mortgage, compared with a household headed by someone of the same age and birth-
cohort that is still paying a mortgage. This result underscores the extent to which New 
Zealanders view the acquisition of residential property as a form of retirement savings. 
The fact that the cohort effects do not change greatly once the home ownership 
variables are added also seems to count against any hypothesis that changes in 
aggregate saving rates have resulted from the greater capital gains made by some 
cohorts due to their ownership of real estate during periods of rapid inflation. 
 
The literature on savings often mentions education as a further source of variation in 
saving rates for households headed by persons of the same age and birth-cohort 
(Attanasio, 1998; Jappelli, 1999). Two problems with studying the effect of education in 
the HES are that questions on educational qualifications were not asked in one survey 
year (1987) and in other years were treated as “not applicable” for three-quarters of the 
household heads aged 65 years and above (n=4546). Dropping observations where 
the qualifications variables were either not applicable, not specified, or missing reduces 
the sample by one-fifth ( n=37922) and especially excludes households headed by 
older persons.  
 
                                                 
41 For example, using a fifth-order polynomial to control for age of the household head, a probit model 
shows that sole-parenthood is significantly more likely amongst household heads born since 1970.    29
This change in the estimation sample  means that two regressions are required to see 
what impact the education variables have. The first model (in column (iv)) controls for 
the change in sample, while the second (in column (v)) adds variables for whether the 
household head has no qualifications, school qualifications or vocation qualifications, 
with those with university qualifications as the excluded category. The comparison of 
columns (v) and (iv) shows little change in the estimated cohort effects with the addition 
of the qualifications variables, which anyway do not attract especially large or 
statistically significant coefficients. Therefore, we ignore any further role for education 
in our analyses. 
 
Figure 6.1 plots the cohort intercepts estimated at the mean, median, 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles of the distribution of saving rates, along with the intercepts from the models 
that include conditioning variables. It is evident that the introduction of controls for 
within-cell heterogeneity does not greatly modify the relative magnitude of the cohort 
dummies, tending to cause variation only for the most recently born cohorts. There is 
rather more variation in the patterns of cohort effects estimated at different points in the 
distribution, so we return to that point below, in considering whether the results are 
robust to increasingly severe trimming of outliers from the estimation sample. The other 
notable feature of Figure 6.1 is its similarity to results reported by Attanasio (1998, 
Figure 9); in the U.S. the household saving rate falls for the first four five-year birth-
cohorts from 1910-14 to 1925-29, and then rises for each of the younger cohorts. With 
the exception of the later dating of the turning point in New Zealand (the 1930-34 
cohort) and the inclusion of cohorts born post-1959, the patterns in the two countries 
are quite similar. 
 
One concern with the controls for within-cell heterogeneity that have been introduced in 
Table 6.2 may be that household saving rates are allowed to vary within-cells only 
according to the characteristics of the household head. To see whether this restrictive 
way of controlling for heterogeneity matters, we replace these household head 
variables with variables that measure the prevalence of a characteristic at the 
household level. For example, instead of using a dummy variable for whether the 
household head is of Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity we use the proportion of 
household members who are of Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity. These alternative 
estimates, reported in the first three columns of Table 6.3, do not change the patterns 
amongst the estimated cohort effects. The patterns amongst the conditioning variables 
are also quite similar to those that were found when the characteristics of the 
household head were used.  
 
A further check on the robustness of the cohort effects to different conditioning 
variables was made by adding a set of income source variables to the model (column 
(iv), Table 6.3). Unsurprisingly, saving rates were lower, the greater the proportion of 
household income from New Zealand Superannuation, private pensions and welfare 
benefits, while even reliance on wage and self-employment income is associated with 
lower saving rates than for the reference category of “other” income. But the most 
important result is that these income proportions do not alter the pattern of cohort 
effects found previously; the lowest saving rates are still found amongst those born in 
the 1930-34 period. 
 
Given the results in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the basic model of five-year birth-cohorts, 
augmented with demographic, employment, family type and tenure status variables, 
appears to give a reasonably robust description of the underlying data. We therefore 
use the predictions from the model in column (iii) of Table 6.2 to illustrate the shape of 
the age profile in mean household saving rates and to show how that profile has shifted   30
up and down across birth cohorts (Figure 6.2). The typical age profile for the average 
saving rate is somewhat hump shaped with a peak around age 57 but does not 
become negative at older ages. While the hump shape is consistent with the lifecycle 
hypothesis, the apparent increase in the saving rate beyond age 70 is not.
42 The 
downward shift in the saving profile for earlier born cohorts, up until the fifth oldest one, 
is also apparent (earlier born cohorts are shown by the start and end points for their 
graph occurring at an older age, which is the age at the time of the first survey in 1984).  
 
6.3  Sensitivity Analyses 
In Figure 6.1 it is apparent that the pattern of cohort effects is more apparent at the 
mean and 75
th percentile of the distribution of saving rates than it is at median and 25
th 
percentile. The quantile regression at the median is based on least absolute deviations 
of the residuals, rather than least squares, and so is less sensitive to the presence of 
outliers. It is therefore worth investigating whether the pattern of cohort effects that has 
been found is just due to some of the extreme values of saving rates that were 
documented in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 6.4 contains the results of the model estimated using either robust methods 
(quantile regression on median saving rates) or various trimmed samples that remove 
extreme values of saving rates. In all cases, the models include the demographic, 
employment, family type and tenure status variables. The results in column (i) show 
that the median saving rate falls from the earliest born cohorts until those born in 1930-
34 and then rises across the cohorts born in later years. Hence, the pattern is the same 
as for the mean saving rates but the rise in saving rates for the most recently born 
cohorts is not as marked.  
 
The predictions from this quantile regression model give the smoothed median saving 
rates in Figure 6.3. The pattern is similar to that for the mean saving rate, except that 
median saving rates are everywhere lower so that there is negative saving at the start 
of the lifecycle and around age 65, and the downward shifts in the profile when moving 
from later to earlier birth cohorts are smaller. 
 
Removing the 24 households in the sample with  10 ‡ x s  shifts all of the cohort 
intercepts down but does not alter the relative position of any of them, so that the same 
basic cohort pattern is apparent (Table 6.4, column (ii)). Removing households with 
these extremely high saving ratios also reverses the coefficient on one of the 
conditioning variables – the receipt of self-employment income. It appears that self-
employment is more prevalent amongst households that report these extremely high 
saving rates  – almost 40 percent of the households with  10 ‡ x s  are headed by 
someone with self-employment income, as opposed to a self-employment rate of only 
11 percent across the whole sample.  
 
Further trimming of the sample, by removing those households with  5 ‡ x s  causes a 
slight ‘flattening’ of the cohort pattern, with the fall in saving rates from the 1910-14 
cohort to the 1930-34 cohort being about two percentage points smaller and the rise in 
saving rates through to the 1975-79 cohort being about 10 percentage points smaller 
(column (iii)). Taking a deeper cut of the sample, by removing households in the top 
                                                 
42 The use of a fifth-order polynomial does mean that the smoothed saving rate will exhibit four turning 
points but the predicted rise in the saving rate beyond age 70 does not appear to be a result of over-fitting 
the data. This same feature was evident in the unrestricted estimates of the mean saving rate in Section 4.   31
three percentiles, with saving rates of  2 ‡ x s  causes a further flattening of the pattern, 
with reductions of about 10 percentage points in the cohort intercepts for the later born 
cohorts (column (iv)). The pattern of cohort effects in mean saving rates amongst 
households where  2 ‡ x s  closely approximates the pattern in median saving rates 
estimated over the full sample. On the other hand, if the sample is trimmed by 
removing households with zero or negative saving rates, the basic ‘V’ shaped is 
accentuated, with saving rates amongst the 1930-34 cohort being 19 percent below 
those for the reference group and saving rates for the 1975-79 cohort being 50 percent 
above those for the reference group.  
 
Figure 6.4 plots the cohort intercepts for each of the models reported in Table 6.4 and 
for the model of mean saving rates estimated on the full sample (Table 6.2, column 
(iii)). Although the magnitude of the cohort effects vary as the sample or estimation 
method is altered, the relative ranking of cohorts does not change. In all cases, saving 
rates fall from earlier to later born cohorts between the 1910-14 and 1930-34 cohorts 
and then the pattern reverses with later born cohorts exhibiting higher saving rates. 
These patterns seem sufficiently robust to warrant further investigation. 
 
 
7  USING DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF SAVING 
The definition of consumption that we have used when deriving the saving rate 
excludes items that are more properly considered as forms of investment and hence 
are a type of saving. In particular, to obtain the estimate of “current” consumption 
expenditure we removed from HES total expenditure, expenses on education, life and 
health insurance, purchases of durable goods, medical expenses, repayments of 
mortgage principle, and contributions to savings. Consequently, our consumption and 
saving variables differ from those that may have been available for previous studies 
and from the definitions used for national aggregates. In this section, we assess 
whether the cohort effects that we have found previously are sensitive to the re-
inclusion of some of these items in the household consumption variable. Rather than 
repeating the entire analysis from Section 6, we concentrate only on the regression 
model for mean saving rates with the demographic, employment, family type and 
tenure status control variables.  
 
Table 7.1 contains the estimates for four regressions on alternative definitions of the 
saving rate, each based on the addition of some categories of expenditure to the 
current consumption variable. The table also includes the estimated mean saving rate 
under each definition. For the purposes of comparison, the results using our preferred 
measure of saving from column (iii) of Table 6.2 are also reported.  
 
If spending on education, health and insurance is considered as a form of consumption 
rather than investment, the mean saving rate falls by about six percentage points. The 
“V” shaped pattern of cohort effects is also flattened somewhat, with reductions of 
about 20 percent in the cohort intercepts for the later born cohorts. Treating the 
repayment of mortgage principle and contributions to household savings as a form of 
consumption has a similar effect on the mean saving rate and on the pattern of cohort 
effects. Neither of these amendments to the consumption and saving variables alter the 
finding that households headed by someone from the 1930-34 birth cohort have the 
lowest saving rates, conditional on age, survey year and the other control variables. 
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If spending on durable goods and vehicles is considered as a form of consumption 
rather than investment, the average saving rate is halved and the “V” shaped pattern of 
cohort effects is slightly accentuated, with the latter born cohorts having saving rates 
that are about five percent higher than under our preferred definition of saving. When 
all of these expenditure categories are included, and the saving rate is derived from 
total consumption rather than from current consumption, the cohort intercepts fall for all 
cohorts and especially for the more recent ones but the basic “V” shape is still 
apparent. 
 
The cohort effects estimated under these different definitions of consumption and 
saving are plotted in Figure 7.1. These graphs illustrate the robustness of the relative 
cohort effects and especially the location of lower saving rates amongst those born ca. 
1925-1939. The pattern of cohort effects in Figure 7.1 is consistent with our other 
sensitivity checks, including trimming the sample (Figure 6.4) and controlling for within-
cell heterogeneity (Figure 6.1). Hence, we are confident that this lower saving rate for 
those born ca. 1925-1939 is a genuine feature of the saving behaviour of New Zealand 
households rather than just some artefact of the data or of our econometric 
procedures. Hence, the next task is to explain this cohort pattern of saving rates.  
 
 
8  EXPLORING THE COHORT PATTERNS 
Section 6 reported on the pattern of coefficients for the birth year cohorts. A range of 
these estimates for different quantiles and with different sets of controls was reported in 
Figure 6.1. They display a distinct V-shaped pattern. In short, saving rates appeared to 
differ significantly for different cohorts. 
 
As noted, these cohort coefficients are estimated with reference to the 1910-14 birth 
cohort. In Table 6.2, column (iii) the coefficients for cohorts 3, 4 and 5 are all 
significantly lower than the reference cohort. In contrast, the coefficients for cohorts 9 
through 14 are all significantly greater. In other words, those born from 1920 to the mid-
1930s have demonstrably lower lifetime saving rates, while those born after 1950 have 
significantly higher rates of saving.  
 
At first glance this result may seem surprising. Anecdotal evidence might have 
suggested that those born in the early inter-war period would have been conditioned by 
wars and the Great Depression, which could have lead to higher saving rates, at the 
least that part of saving driven by a precautionary motive.  In contrast, the post WWII 
cohorts facing greater economic growth and security, together with liberalised financial 
markets after 1986, might have been expected to have displayed greater profligacy, 
and have lower, not higher, rates of saving. 
 
While these effects may be responsible for some influence on the estimated 
coefficients, clearly some other forces have operated to override them and produce a 
‘V’ rather than an ‘inverted-V’ shaped pattern of saving by birth cohorts.  
 
It is important to explore further the cohort pattern of saving. As cohorts with different 
patterns of saving move through their life cycle, they may influence the aggregate 
pattern of saving. The cohorts with significantly lower saving rates were aged between   33
45 and 60 in 1980, and entering their peak saving years. This is precisely the time that 
aggregate household saving was observed to start declining (Choy, 2000)
43.   
 
Attanasio (1998) finds a remarkably similar ‘V-shaped’ pattern of cohort saving 
behaviour. He notes that the lower saving rates of the group aged in their 40s and 50s 
in the 1980s “are those mainly responsible for the decline in aggregate 
saving…because those cohorts were in the part of their lifecycle when saving are 
highest” (p.604). While he adds that even in the USA where the data are much more 
consistent, it is not possible to precisely match the aggregate and micro level data. 
Nevertheless, the estimated cohort effects “explain a substantial part of the decline in 
the aggregate saving rate”. 
 
Attanasio continues, noting that: 
 
”The main deficiency of the analysis is its failure to explain why those 
particular cohorts did not save ‘enough’. A plausible hypothesis, that I have 
not tested explicitly, is that the negative cohort effects for the middle 
cohorts are linked to increases in social security entitlements that the same 
cohorts have enjoyed” (p.604). 
 
The cohort patterns found in the present study, as well as mirroring those found for the 
USA by Attanasio, are quite robust. As shown in Figure 6.1, with the exception of the 
25
th percentile, all the estimates share the inverted-V pattern. The pattern is particularly 
marked for the 75
th percentile. This is a potentially important finding in terms of 
understanding the decline in aggregate savings. The 75
th percentile represents higher 
income households, which account for a significant part of the total absolute savings. 
 
Attanasio posited that more generous public pensions might have explained the 
different lifetime saving patterns of different cohorts. If over an individual’s lifetime there 
is increasingly generous provision by the state for public pensions, it seems entirely 
plausible that this would shape expectations about the level of publicly subsidised 
pension that one might receive. Those expectations could then in turn influence an 
individual’s decisions about the optimal allocation of consumption over their lifetime. 
Knowing (or at least predicting) that there would be a generous state pension to 
underpin consumption levels after retirement may lead to higher consumption prior to 
retirement from a given level of lifetime wealth. The consequence would be that the 
lifetime saving rate would be lower than in the absence of the public pension scheme, 
or with a less generous scheme.  
 
If this were the case one would expect to see lower saving rates among those cohorts 
whose expectations were for the receipt of a more generous pension and higher rates 
among those who expected to receive lower real pension payments. 
 
The impact of the social and economic environment over the lifetime of an individual 
(household) could be called the direct effect. There is also the indirect effect 
transmitted through family and those close to a person. These are the values and 
norms that are transmitted to them by their parents and others, and which in turn were 
formed by the conditions prevailing in an earlier time and shaping the values of their 
                                                 
43 It should be recalled however, that because of conflicting trends in the estimates of saving rates 
between the HES and the SNA data, some caution is needed in using results from the HES (with an 
overall rising rate of saving) to “explain” the falls observed in the saving rates estimated from the national 
accounts.    34
parents. In that sense, the behaviour patterns observed at any one time are a function 
of the prevailing climate, the expectations of the future climate, together with the effects 
of all previous environments. Those in the most immediate past could be expected to 
have the greatest effect, with the impact tailing off the further back we go
44. We have 
not tried to explicitly allow for these indirect influences of past conditions, which might 
shape the behaviour of a particular cohort. 
 
To proceed further with this hypothesis, it is necessary to posit some mechanism of 
how and when expectations are formed. Clearly this is a complex process, and one 
that would reflect the person’s perception of their economic and social environment. In 
addition, the experiences of their parents and that of their childhood could well 
condition their perceptions and the need for saving. The environment prevailing during 
their working lives will affect their labour market experience and earnings (the ability to 
save) while the provision of social services (health, education, housing, pensions) and 
welfare (sickness, disability, unemployment, family and single mother benefits) will 
influence the need to save. 
 
Other factors including capital gains on housing, real interest rates, rates of income 
growth, access to credit and life expectancy could all be expected to impinge on the 
decision to allocate income to current or future consumption. In addition, the desire to 
make bequests will also influence the saving rate. 
 
In short there are a wide range of possible indicators that might affect the decisions of 
individuals with regard to their saving rate. Some of these will operate throughout their 
working lives. Given that the peak saving years are typically between ages 45 and 60, 
an individual’s perceptions and expectations during this period, would arguably have a 
significant influence on their saving behaviour. 
 
Essentially there are two steps in the argument: the first, that different cohorts operated 
in different environments; and the second that these different environments shaped the 
responses of different cohorts, particularly in the present case, with respect to their 
household saving behaviour.  
 
Thomson (1996) documents changes that would support the first of these steps. He 
argues that over “the last 50 years welfare states have been very uneven in the 
benefits they provide for successive generations, that is for people born in different 
decades” (p.1). “The prizes and penalties of living in a welfare state are distributed 
more on the basis of birth date than of need, justice or desert. In New Zealand the big 
winners in this have been the ‘welfare generation’ – those born between about 1920 
and 1945” (1991, p.1).  
 
Testing these hypotheses is clearly a challenge on at least four counts. First we have 
little theoretical guidance as to how expectations are formed; in particular what relative 
weight should be assigned to each of the three critical periods: 
•  The experience of the previous generations particularly parents and 
grandparents which through norms and values could be expected to shape the 
saving behaviour of a particular cohort; 
•  The conditions prevailing during their  working life and in particular applying 
during the peak saving years 
                                                 
44 Counter examples can be found where some traditions are handed on virtually unchanged through 
many generations.   35
•  Their expectations throughout their working lives about the level and eligibility 
for state support of retirement income. 
Second, we need long time series, arguably covering the last 70 years to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the different policy environments enjoyed by different 
cohorts; third, we only have 14 observations of the “dependent” variable. ie, the cohort 
dummies that relate lifetime saving behaviour to year of birth
45, meaning the scope for 
any statistical tests is limited; and fourth, as the working lives and saving periods of the 
later cohorts extend into the future, some forecasts of future conditions will be involved 
in order to compare their behaviour with that of individuals from the older cohorts who 
are either retired or dead.  
 
In what follows we “test” the hypotheses in a very elementary way. Basically we look at 
a series of indicators for which we can obtain at least partial data. Often we focus only 
on selected years or periods that might be “typical or representative”, or occur at that 
time of peak saving
46. In effect we are conducting in a loose manner a non-parametric 
sign test as an initial step. Are changes in the indicators broadly consistent with the 
hypothesis that the savings patterns of different birth cohorts could have been 
influenced by the economic and social policy environment prevailing at key points in 
the lifetimes? The objective is to make a preliminary foray to establish whether the 
patterns of some key variables that arguably affect the saving decisions of individuals 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the cohort differences reflect the external 
environment. In particular, we examine both labour market indicators (the ability to 
save) and some measures of public pensions and welfare (affecting the incentive to 
save). 
 
Table 8.1 summarises the working life (assumed to be 40 years from age 20) and the 
peak earning years (assumed to be from ages 45 to 60) for each of the key birth year 
cohorts selected for this section. The first cohort (1910-14) is the reference cohort in 
the sense that the regression coefficients for cohort presented in Section 6 are 
referenced to this cohort, which has a value of zero. The lifetime saving rate of the 
adjoining cohort (1915-19) is not significantly different. The next three cohorts covering 
birth years from 1920 to 1934 are the group that typically have demonstrated 
significantly lower lifetime saving rates, while the last two (covering 1950 to 1959) are 
representative of those showing a significantly greater level of lifetime saving rate. 
 
In what follows we examine some selected aspects of the economic and social 
environment facing the different cohorts both over their working lives as a whole, and in 
particular during their peak saving years. The question posed is the following: do those 
indicators vary in a way that is consistent with the observed cohort patterns in saving 
rates? We would expect to find that the proxies chosen for the economic and social 
environment adopted values less favourable for household saving rates during the 
critical years of the low saving cohorts, while the same indicator should be more 
favourable in years corresponding to the high saving cohorts. 
 
                                                 
45 It is true that we could estimate the saving rate models with many more cohort dummies; in fact, 
potentially one for each birth year of all the individuals (or household heads) in the sample, as we have 
done in Sections 4 and 5. This would span some 80 years. However these estimates would tend to be 
noisy; making it difficult to estimate relationships with the policy variables which show much less year-
to-year variance. 
46 Clearly this approach could be enhanced with more continuous time-series data from the 1930s to the 
present, but that is not an insignificant task, and one we assign to the category of “future research 
directions”.   36
Because of the magnitude of the task of assembling annual data on a wide range of 
variables in a consistent manner for 70 years, we have chosen to use selected years to 
illustrate the results. We focus on three cohorts: 1 (born 1910-14), 4 (born 1925-29) 
and 9 (born 1950-54), and will refer to these as the reference, early and late cohorts. 
Typically we will look at the values of the indicator variable prevailing during their peak 
saving years (given in Table 8.1). 
 
We start with some key indicators relating to the labour market. The extent of 
unemployment is a critical factor affecting the expected flow of earnings. Those cohorts 
facing a lower probability of unemployment would be expected to have less incentive 
for precautionary saving. The unemployment rates (based on the average of the 
census years) facing the reference and early cohorts were 1.2 and 3.3 percent 
respectively, while based largely on projections the late cohort could face an average 
of 6 percent. 
 
A further important labour market indicator is the rate of participation. The reference 
group had labour force participation rates of 94 and 35 percent for male and females 
workers. In contrast the early cohort faced 89 and 46 percent. The significant increase 
for women would be consistent with the lower saving rates of this group. The late 
cohort could face rates of 85 and 70 percent, suggesting a possible drop in the saving 
rates in future.  
 
Those facing expectations of higher future income growth rates might be expected to 
have lower rates of saving. It is certainly true that real income growth rates (both GDP 
and household disposable incomes) were higher for the early cohort and lower for the 
later (higher saving) cohort
47.  
 
Increasingly in New Zealand over the last century the state has assumed the role of 
saving for the household through the provision of subsidised (or free) education and 
health services, social insurance (sickness and unemployment benefits), family support 
(family allowances, capitalisation of family benefits, support to solo mothers) and 
generous levels of retirement income support.
48 It is to be expected that the incentive 
for voluntary saving by households would be reduced in the presence of these 
programmes; further, the more generous the programmes the greater the disincentive 
effect
49. As a result, we would expect that the lower savers faced more and the higher 
savers faced less generous state subsidies in health, education and welfare.  
 
Much work remains to develop consistent series for health and education benefits. In 
the case of pensions, the pension:wage ratio was low to medium for the reference 
group, was markedly higher for the early cohorts (typically over 80 percent for a decade 
from the late 1970s), and lower for the late cohorts (expected to average 65 percent)
50. 
                                                 
47 We note however that is contrasts with the view that growth raises saving by redistributing resources 
away from older dis-saving cohorts towards those who are younger and more active savers. 
48 It could be argued that in the absence of these state funded programmes private charities provided much 
of the social insurance, and by so doing had a similar effect on dampening the incentive to save as does 
state provision. This is undoubtedly true to some extent, but we would expect that most people would see 
the state system as more certain than relying on private charity, eligibility for which might have depended 
on certain behavioural patterns and religious proclivities seen as desirable by the providers. 
49 As an illustration, between 1900 and 1935 the total payments for civil pensions and family allowances 
rose from $314,000 to $4,109,658, which per head of European population corresponded to $0.40 to 
$2.75. By 1941, all pensions and social security had reached over $15 per head (NZOYB, 1939 (p.518) 
and 1942 (p.506). 
50 See Preston (1999).   37
During the 1970s when the early cohort was at its peak saving period the real weekly 
pension for a married person rose from $135 to over $200 (in constant June 2000 
terms). Over the next decade this fell and reached a low of $163 in September 1996. 
By June 2000 it had recovered to $174.In  other words the early cohort faced the 
prospects of very substantial real increases in the state pension, a position that was not 
subsequently sustained. This is consistent with the early cohort making less retirement 
provision than the later cohort who face lower real pensions and greater uncertainty 
about their viability. 
 
For many households, saving for housing is an important element of voluntary saving. 
If there was a significant probability of being allocated a state house at a subsidised 
rate with generous conditions for purchase it is likely that the incentive for voluntary 
saving would be commensurately diminished. In fact, lower savers faced a housing 
market in which the number of state houses being built was much greater than in later 
years
51. Added to this, low savers who were paying off mortgages in the 1970s and 
early 1980s face negative real interest rates, further reducing the cost of housing and 
permitting consumption levels to be higher than they would have been had housing 
costs taken a greater share of disposable incomes. 
 
In the past family sizes were larger. Having more children increases the probability that 
the parents will receive support in retirement for their children. Reduced family size in 
later years would be consistent with later cohorts being higher savers than the older 
cohorts with larger families. 
 
As an increasing share of the costs of tertiary education has been shifted from the state 
to individuals, it is to be expected that younger cohorts would have more incentive to 
make provision for their children’s educational costs. This tendency would be 
reinforced by the marked increase in tertiary participation rates. 
 
Up to this point our consideration of the different saving behaviour of older and younger 
cohorts has focussed largely on the state provided benefits that they could have 
expected. Of course to meet these costs taxes had to be paid, so a full 
intergenerational accounting requires us to incorporate not only market earnings and 
state benefits, but taxation payments as well.
52 This has not been attempted here. 
Thomson (1991) compares a prototypical early family (born 1930) with a late family 
(born 1955) and traces their lifetime earnings, taxes and benefits. He finds that the 
benefit:tax ratio for the so-called early family was 2.3 while the corresponding ratio for 
the late family was 0.6 to 0.8 (p.172). This result is strikingly consistent with the pattern 
of lifetime saving behaviour displayed by different birth cohorts in the present study.  
 
In this section we have focussed on the lifetime saving patterns of different cohorts. 
People born at different times, all other things being held constant, demonstrate 
different lifetime saving rates. There are two reasons why this result is important. In the 
first place, it might h elp to explain the changes in aggregate saving behaviour. 
Unfortunately, in the case of New Zealand, we cannot carry this too far until we have a 
better understanding of how to reconcile the saving rates from the SNA and the HES. 
Our results here suggest younger cohorts have higher saving rates than their parents, 
but we are not yet able to link that to the observed decline in aggregate household 
saving rates. 
 
                                                 
51 For example, in 1949-50, over 20 percent of all new dwellings completed were state houses. 
52 A complete accounting would require tracking of asset holdings and changes in asset values.    38
In the second place, if the different saving behaviour of different cohorts is due in part 
to the economic and social climate prevailing during their lifetimes, and in particular if 
different policies were operative for different cohorts, then we can at least start to better 
understand the impact of policies on household saving behaviour. This should 
contribute to better being able to predict the effect of policy changes in the future. 
 
We stress that the while the results of the cohort saving behaviour (Section 6) seem 
robust and significant, our attempt to provide an explanation is partial and tentative. 
This is a complex area and the saving rates we observe are the resolution of a set of 
forces encompassing social and cultural norms, economic conditions and a myriad of 
state interventions. Arguably, the provision of higher state benefits, or more certainty 
would be expected to dampen the incentive for private saving. Our preliminary 
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Table 2.1: Sample Size and Savings Rates by Survey Year 
      Savings Rate (S/X) 
  Total 
Sample 












1984  3331    0.376  -0.058  0.227  0.613  0.189 
1985  3295    0.287  -0.106  0.168  0.498  0.139 
1986  3174    0.318  -0.078  0.201  0.551  0.177 
1987  3210    0.341  -0.084  0.209  0.581  0.204 
1988  4021    0.347  -0.043  0.212  0.563  0.200 
1989  3142    0.358  -0.080  0.207  0.601  0.200 
1990  3047    0.313  -0.110  0.188  0.560  0.166 
1991  2674    0.340  -0.099  0.193  0.575  0.227 
1992  2712    0.380  -0.062  0.217  0.609  0.251 
1993  4244    0.415  -0.057  0.222  0.621  0.270 
1994  2839    0.338  -0.096  0.197  0.546  0.235 
1995  2695    0.336  -0.110  0.191  0.607  0.234 
1996  2621    0.355  -0.111  0.186  0.572  0.246 
1997  2642    0.359  -0.091  0.193  0.578  0.259 
1998  2622    0.428  -0.081  0.238  0.676  0.320 
Total  46269    0.353  -0.086  0.202  0.584  0.222 
Note: Year is the year the survey ended, so 1984 is the survey year from April 1983 – March 1984. 
 
















< 0.0  14755  -10238  -1561727  -1  33864  947  1566493 
< 0.1  4149  1419  0  10562  28268  2311  127874 
< 0.2  4151  4164  600  21859  27991  5258  130329 
< 0.3  3724  6733  879  32241  27038  2950  125474 
< 0.4  3294  9270  1217  69819  26546  3606  227809 
< 0.5  2759  11505  1814  98661  25726  3882  237113 
< 0.6  2341  13768  130  91261  25142  250  167609 
< 0.7  1923  15740  3110  80006  24288  4694  127835 
< 0.8  1557  17239  3190  94659  23092  4373  120173 
< 0.9  1178  19068  3477  193140  22450  4173  220203 
< 1.0  1013  20721  1496  103943  21851  1526  112267 
< 2.0  4036  27465  3430  236500  20491  2870  129614 
< 5.0  1232  50013  5809  668172  18239  1869  151723 
< 10.0  133  103283  4835  780217  15809  945  122334 
‡ 10  24  110485  14346  444324  8192  593  30593 
               
Total  46269  6188  -1561727  780217  27862  250  1566493 
 
  
Table 2.3: Savings by Household Disposable Income Decile 
        Savings Rate (S/X) 



























1  8540  -8720  -0.005  -0.115  -0.539  -0.166  0.184  -0.404 
2  14188  -2870  -0.005  0.088  -0.247  -0.004  0.292  -0.118 
3  17698  -1150  -0.001  0.153  -0.171  0.056  0.339  -0.041 
4  21807  96  -0.006  0.190  -0.150  0.091  0.397  0.003 
5  26428  2753  0.002  0.275  -0.091  0.146  0.479  0.074 
6  31400  5885  0.003  0.343  -0.031  0.224  0.547  0.142 
7  36933  9547  0.002  0.424  0.035  0.287  0.629  0.208 
8  43686  13790  0.005  0.493  0.083  0.348  0.692  0.266 
9  53357  21280  0.007  0.614  0.164  0.448  0.851  0.361 
10  86465  52390  0.036  1.069  0.294  0.669  1.299  0.675 
                  
ALL  34049  93001  0.004  0.353  -0.086  0.202  0.584  0.222 
Note: Decile 1 is poorest and decile 10 is richest. All monetary figures are in December 1993 values, with the 
March Qtr CPI used as the deflator. The time trend in mean S/X comes from a linear regression on a time index 




Table 2.4: Household income, expenditure and saving by income and expenditure deciles 
  By income decile    By expenditure decile 
Decile  Income  Expenditure  Saving    Income  Expenditure  Saving 
1  8540  14341  -5801    14792  8007  6785 
2  14188  16094  -1906    19123  12584  6539 
3  17698  18461  -764    22330  15933  6396 
4  21807  21743  64    25873  19156  6716 
5  26428  24597  1831    29891  22400  7491 
6  31400  27485  3915    33842  25882  7960 
7  36933  30582  6351    37448  29922  7526 
8  43686  34509  9177    42491  34987  7504 
9  53357  39202  14155    48761  42466  6295 
10  86465  51607  34858    65951  67288  -1338 
               
All  34049  27862  6187    34049  27862  6187 
Note:  
Figures are weighted averages over all households in each decile. The deciles are formed from the combined 
sample of households from the 1983-84 to 1997-98 Household Economic Surveys, with all values put in 
December 1993 prices (using the March quarter CPI for each year). 
Expenditure is “Current Consumption Expenditure” which excludes expenses on medical, education, durables, 
mortgage principal, other capital expenditures, contributions to savings and life and health insurance payments. 
Income is “Household Disposable Income”. 
  
Table 2.5: Sample Sizes, Median Ages and Savings Rates by Population Sub-groups 
      Savings Rate (S/X) 
















Characteristics of the household head 
Maori/Pacific  4680  37  0.325  -0.070  0.196  0.565  0.215 
Other  41589  43  0.356  -0.087  0.203  0.586  0.223 
               
Male  28531  43  0.389  -0.065  0.231  0.616  0.240 
Female  17738  42  0.298  -0.111  0.160  0.527  0.189 
               
Working  29716  39  0.395  -0.050  0.244  0.629  0.251 
Job seeker  940  37  0.155  -0.176  0.059  0.375  0.089 
Not in Lab. Force  15613  60  0.285  -0.133  0.133  0.505  0.140 
Age of household head             
19-24  3260  22  0.217  -0.125  0.147  0.448  0.130 
25-34  10910  30  0.261  -0.102  0.159  0.491  0.157 
35-44  10898  39  0.302  -0.106  0.173  0.532  0.181 
45-54  7934  49  0.472  -0.035  0.281  0.703  0.312 
55-64  6959  60  0.465  -0.073  0.257  0.723  0.325 
65-74  6308  69  0.396  -0.065  0.224  0.632  0.236 
Household type             
Single adult  7831  57  0.395  -0.127  0.181  0.597  0.200 
Couple, no children   11428  56  0.457  -0.026  0.288  0.717  0.320 
Sole parent  4213  38  0.154  -0.181  0.058  0.347  0.071 
Couple + children  17197  39  0.315  -0.086  0.191  0.535  0.198 
Mixed family  3416  42  0.394  -0.031  0.257  0.648  0.248 
Non-family  2184  26  0.265  -0.093  0.199  0.530  0.171 
               
Dwelling Tenure           
Renting  11820  33  0.203  -0.134  0.121  0.432  0.126 
Rent-free  1502  38  0.726  -0.041  0.341  1.001  0.383 
Own, mortgaged  17070  38  0.271  -0.068  0.191  0.511  0.169 
Own  mortgage-free  15877  58  0.506  -0.066  0.279  0.775  0.346 
               




Table 3.1: Cohort Definitions, Cell Size and Savings Rates 





















1910-14  70-74  116  581  0.497  0.002  0.317  0.802  0.311 
1915-19  65-74  174  1,743  0.431  -0.037  0.241  0.674  0.263 
1920-24  60-74  201  3,009  0.426  -0.069  0.235  0.657  0.267 
1925-29  55-73  235  3,518  0.396  -0.083  0.216  0.647  0.253 
1930-34  50-68  224  3,361  0.405  -0.076  0.242  0.631  0.266 
1935-39  45-63  222  3,324  0.449  -0.051  0.265  0.711  0.277 
1940-44  40-58  270  4,047  0.474  -0.053  0.251  0.701  0.304 
1945-49  35-53  330  4,955  0.383  -0.070  0.221  0.600  0.257 
1950-54  30-48  375  5,624  0.322  -0.112  0.187  0.559  0.196 
1955-59  25-43  382  5,726  0.277  -0.103  0.162  0.507  0.164 
1960-64  20-38  362  5,437  0.261  -0.103  0.158  0.470  0.164 
1965-69  19-33  206  3,087  0.254  -0.097  0.167  0.495  0.173 
1970-74  19-28  155  1,553  0.260  -0.099  0.168  0.521  0.194 
1975-79  19-23  61  304  0.156  -0.236  0.030  0.392  0.033 
All 











  Average of 
Means 
  Average 
of Medians 
1, 2  72-76    0.463,  0.412    0.293,  0.249 
2, 3  67-76    0.428,  0.396    0.263,  0.222 
3, 4  62-71    0.440,  0.340    0.238,  0.183 
4, 5  57-66    0.428,  0.385    0.248,  0.204 
5, 6  52-61    0.444,  0.502    0.261,  0.291 
6, 7   47-56    0.428,  0.550    0.276,  0.288 
7, 8  42-51    0.426,  0.440    0.238,  0.264 
8, 9  37-46    0.324,  0.368    0.197,  0.231 
9, 10  32-41    0.277,  0.301    0.164,  0.177 
10, 11  27-36    0.250,  0.264    0.154,  0.153 
11, 12  22-31    0.270,  0.266    0.176,  0.180 
12, 13  17-26    0.189,  0.281    0.125,  0.171 
13, 14  17-21    0.291,  0.127    0.162,  0.035 
Note: 
Cohort 1 is those households whose head is born 1910-14, while cohort 14 is those whose head is born 1975-79. 
  
Table 6.1: Cohort Effects in Individual Savings Rates, Controlling for Age and Time Effects 










Cohort 2 (b. 1915-19)  -0.045  -0.007  -0.036  -0.136 
  (1.06)  (0.25)  (1.14)  (3.05)** 
Cohort 3 (b. 1920-24)  -0.063  -0.014  -0.051  -0.165 
  (1.41)  (0.47)  (1.51)  (3.42)** 
Cohort 4 (b. 1925-29)  -0.122  -0.030  -0.084  -0.225 
  (2.55)*  (0.90)  (2.30)*  (4.31)** 
Cohort 5 (b. 1930-34)  -0.142  -0.046  -0.106  -0.279 
  (2.65)**  (1.24)  (2.62)**  (4.84)** 
Cohort 6 (b. 1935-39)  -0.066  -0.033  -0.081  -0.190 
  (1.05)  (0.83)  (1.85)+  (3.03)** 
Cohort 7 (b. 1940-44)  0.054  -0.021  -0.051  -0.074 
  (0.72)  (0.48)  (1.07)  (1.10) 
Cohort 8 (b. 1945-49)  0.106  0.002  -0.004  0.003 
  (1.42)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04) 
Cohort 9 (b. 1950-54)  0.168  -0.017  0.020  0.102 
  (2.08)*  (0.35)  (0.37)  (1.31) 
Cohort 10 (b. 1955-59)  0.198  0.003  0.029  0.121 
  (2.32)*  (0.05)  (0.50)  (1.48) 
Cohort 11 (b. 1960-64)  0.223  0.011  0.040  0.122 
  (2.48)*  (0.20)  (0.66)  (1.41) 
Cohort 12 (b. 1965-69)  0.245  0.019  0.054  0.178 
  (2.61)**  (0.32)  (0.84)  (1.93)+ 
Cohort 13 (b. 1970-74)  0.281  0.035  0.074  0.250 
  (2.89)**  (0.55)  (1.08)  (2.56)* 
Cohort 14 (b. 1975-79)  0.263  -0.081  -0.013  0.211 
  (2.39)*  (1.12)  (0.16)  (1.87)+ 
Age  1.332  0.759  0.998  1.644 
  (8.61)**  (7.32)**  (8.78)**  (10.04)** 
Age
2  -0.067  -0.038  -0.051  -0.083 
  (8.90)**  (7.64)**  (9.29)**  (10.52)** 
Age
3  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.002 
  (9.18)**  (7.95)**  (9.76)**  (10.93)** 
Age
4  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (9.35)**  (8.21)**  (10.09)**  (11.16)** 
Age
5  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (9.40)**  (8.41)**  (10.29)**  (11.21)** 
Constant  -10.098  -5.910  -7.390  -12.190 
  (8.18)**  (7.10)**  (8.11)**  (9.26)** 
         
R
2  0.0135  0.0042  0.0064  0.0144 
Cohort effects = 0  P < 0.000  P < 0.003  P < 0.000  P < 0.000 
Age effects = 0  P < 0.000  P < 0.000  P < 0.000  P < 0.000 
Year effects = 0  P < 0.001  P < 0.000  P < 0.005  P < 0.000 
Note:  
Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; 
+ significant at 10% level * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. The sample has N=46269 
observations. Each regression also includes 13 time dummies, whose coefficients are constrained to sum up to 




Table 6.2: Cohort Effects in Mean Savings Rate With Conditioning Variables 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
Cohort 2  -0.046  -0.054  -0.058  -0.117  -0.118 
  (1.07)  (1.28)  (1.36)  (1.26)  (1.28) 
Cohort 3  -0.061  -0.075  -0.076  -0.291  -0.292 
  (1.36)  (1.69)+  (1.70)+  (2.36)*  (2.37)* 
Cohort 4  -0.117  -0.130  -0.140  -0.433  -0.433 
  (2.44)*  (2.73)**  (2.93)**  (3.36)**  (3.37)** 
Cohort 5  -0.131  -0.149  -0.161  -0.479  -0.477 
  (2.44)*  (2.80)**  (3.02)**  (3.52)**  (3.50)** 
Cohort 6  -0.048  -0.070  -0.082  -0.452  -0.448 
  (0.76)  (1.12)  (1.31)  (3.07)**  (3.04)** 
Cohort 7  0.080  0.058  0.028  -0.389  -0.383 
  (1.06)  (0.77)  (0.37)  (2.38)*  (2.34)* 
Cohort 8  0.139  0.118  0.086  -0.376  -0.369 
  (1.86)+  (1.58)  (1.16)  (2.19)*  (2.14)* 
Cohort 9  0.212  0.194  0.155  -0.342  -0.336 
  (2.60)**  (2.37)*  (1.91)+  (1.83)+  (1.79)+ 
Cohort 10  0.254  0.242  0.204  -0.338  -0.330 
  (2.93)**  (2.78)**  (2.36)*  (1.67)+  (1.63) 
Cohort 11  0.290  0.289  0.254  -0.339  -0.331 
  (3.16)**  (3.14)**  (2.78)**  (1.55)  (1.50) 
Cohort 12  0.322  0.321  0.284  -0.353  -0.343 
  (3.38)**  (3.35)**  (2.99)**  (1.51)  (1.46) 
Cohort 13  0.366  0.378  0.350  -0.334  -0.323 
  (3.70)**  (3.79)**  (3.54)**  (1.33)  (1.28) 
Cohort 14  0.351  0.382  0.336  -0.392  -0.376 
  (3.13)**  (3.39)**  (2.99)**  (1.43)  (1.37) 
Male head  0.093  0.042  0.037  0.049  0.051 
  (9.31)**  (3.75)**  (3.17)**  (3.72)**  (3.72)** 
Maori/Pacific head  0.005  0.049  0.095  0.085  0.080 
  (0.38)  (3.95)**  (7.69)**  (6.58)**  (6.16)** 
Working head    0.172  0.159  0.140  0.143 
    (10.62)**  (9.50)**  (7.41)**  (7.37)** 
Unemployed head    -0.069  -0.060  -0.079  -0.079 
    (2.49)*  (2.23)*  (2.78)**  (2.79)** 
Head has self-employment  0.126  0.075  0.059  0.059 
 Income    (5.96)**  (3.59)**  (2.66)**  (2.64)** 
Paying mortgage      0.043  0.056  0.060 
      (4.54)**  (5.58)**  (5.96)** 
Rent/mortgage-free      0.297  0.334  0.336 
      (19.56)**  (18.91)**  (19.22)** 
Sole parent w/ children      -0.147  -0.163  -0.163 
      (9.76)**  (10.20)**  (10.26)** 
Couple with children      -0.103  -0.115  -0.115 
      (8.70)**  (8.97)**  (8.93)** 
No school qualifications          -0.022 
          (1.24) 
School quals only          -0.045 
          (2.24)* 
Vocational qualification
a          -0.075 
          (4.52)** 
Constant  -9.849  -8.741  -7.852  -7.607  -7.519 
  (8.01)**  (6.94)**  (6.36)**  (4.97)**  (4.83)** 
           
Sample size  46269  46269  46269  37922  37922 
R-squared  0.016  0.024  0.040  0.044  0.044 Note:  
Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; + significant 
at 10% level * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. Each regression includes a fifth-order polynomial in 
age of the household head and 13 time dummies, with coefficients constrained to sum up to zero and to be orthogonal 
to a linear trend. Excluded categories are female head, non-Maori and non-Pacific head, head not in the labour force, 
dwelling is rented, family type is single adult, couple without children, mixed and non-family, head has a university 
qualifications. For each regression, tests of the hypothesis that either the age, cohort or time effects are jointly zero are 
rejected at the p<0.001 level. 
Columns (iv) and (v) exclude observations from 1987 (data on qualifications unavailable), exclude most households 
where the head’s age exceeded 65, because the qualifications question was not usually asked of this group, and 
excludes those for whom qualifications were not specified. 
a Includes trade and “other” qualifications. 
 
  
Table 6.3: Cohort Effects in Mean Savings Rate With Household-level Conditioning Variables  
    (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
Cohort 2    -0.046  -0.053  -0.057  -0.052 
    (1.09)  (1.26)  (1.34)  (1.26) 
Cohort 3    -0.061  -0.072  -0.075  -0.046 
    (1.38)  (1.63)  (1.68)+  (1.05) 
Cohort 4    -0.124  -0.134  -0.146  -0.121 
    (2.60)**  (2.83)**  (3.05)**  (2.57)* 
Cohort 5    -0.143  -0.156  -0.169  -0.145 
    (2.68)**  (2.95)**  (3.18)**  (2.78)** 
Cohort 6    -0.066  -0.091  -0.101  -0.090 
    (1.05)  (1.47)  (1.62)  (1.50) 
Cohort 7    0.054  0.023  0.004  0.036 
    (0.73)  (0.30)  (0.06)  (0.48) 
Cohort 8    0.103  0.071  0.054  0.092 
    (1.39)  (0.96)  (0.73)  (1.26) 
Cohort 9    0.169  0.137  0.118  0.150 
    (2.10)*  (1.69)+  (1.46)  (1.87)+ 
Cohort 10    0.200  0.171  0.155  0.185 
    (2.34)*  (1.99)*  (1.81)+  (2.18)* 
Cohort 11    0.223  0.195  0.186  0.221 
    (2.48)*  (2.15)*  (2.07)*  (2.47)* 
Cohort 12    0.244  0.212  0.206  0.245 
    (2.61)**  (2.24)*  (2.20)*  (2.62)** 
Cohort 13    0.285  0.274  0.275  0.319 
    (2.94)**  (2.79)**  (2.82)**  (3.28)** 
Cohort 14    0.268  0.289  0.271  0.287 
    (2.43)*  (2.60)**  (2.45)*  (2.59)** 
Share of HH who are MALE    0.214  0.164  0.151  0.137 
    (9.09)**  (6.83)**  (6.26)**  (5.83)** 
Share of HH who are Maori/Pacific    -0.004  0.083  0.132  0.160 
    (0.34)  (5.88)**  (9.35)**  (11.70)** 
Share of HH who are working      0.304  0.295  0.198 
      (15.59)**  (12.64)**  (6.68)** 
Share of HH who are unemployed      -0.144  -0.123  -0.140 
      (3.27)**  (2.74)**  (3.17)** 
Share of HH with self-employment      0.253  0.164  -0.007 
 income      (6.01)**  (3.91)**  (0.14) 
Mortgage being paid on dwelling        0.037  0.015 
        (3.98)**  (1.54) 
Dwelling is rent/mortgage-free        0.293  0.244 
        (19.48)**  (17.22)** 
Sole parent with children        -0.086  -0.074 
        (5.10)**  (4.48)** 
Couple with children        -0.022  -0.074 
        (1.52)  (4.71)** 
Share of household income from: 
     Social Welfare Benefits 
       
-0.489 
          (9.09)** 
     Private Pensions          -0.550 
          (3.12)** 
     New Zealand Superannuation          -0.793 
          (12.53)** 
     Self-Employment          -0.083 
          (1.88)+ 
     Wages and Salary          -0.293 
          (6.44)** 
Constant    -10.029  -6.275  -6.064  -3.822 
    (8.16)**  (4.80)**  (4.70)**  (2.85)** 
           
Sample size    46269  46269  46269  46227 
R-squared    0.017  0.033  0.047  0.066 Note:  
Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; + significant 
at 10% level * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. Each regression includes a fifth-order polynomial in 
age of the household head and 13 time dummies, with coefficients constrained to sum up to zero and to be orthogonal 
to a linear trend. For each regression, tests of the hypothesis that either the age, cohort or time effects are jointly zero 
are rejected at the p<0.001 level. 
Results in column (iv) exclude 42 observations with zero household disposable income and the excluded income 
category is “other”, which includes various forms of non-labour income. 
  
Table 6.4: Sensitivity Analysis for Cohort Effects With Conditioning Variables 
  Mean (S/X) on trimmed samples 
 
Median  
(S/X)  (S/X)<10  (S/X)<5  (S/X)<2  (S/X)‡0 
Cohort 2  -0.054  -0.060  -0.045  -0.046  -0.089 
  (2.09)*  (1.48)  (1.26)  (1.59)  (1.83)+ 
Cohort 3  -0.073  -0.076  -0.080  -0.066  -0.091 
  (2.68)**  (1.72)+  (2.14)*  (2.19)*  (1.76)+ 
Cohort 4  -0.112  -0.142  -0.124  -0.093  -0.167 
  (3.74)**  (3.06)**  (3.05)**  (2.85)**  (2.98)** 
Cohort 5  -0.139  -0.165  -0.146  -0.120  -0.191 
  (4.21)**  (3.23)**  (3.26)**  (3.37)**  (3.01)** 
Cohort 6  -0.102  -0.099  -0.093  -0.091  -0.087 
  (2.84)**  (1.75)+  (1.86)+  (2.32)*  (1.15) 
Cohort 7  -0.070  -0.023  -0.036  -0.065  0.048 
  (1.79)+  (0.36)  (0.65)  (1.53)  (0.51) 
Cohort 8  -0.029  0.060  0.025  -0.021  0.100 
  (0.69)  (0.89)  (0.43)  (0.46)  (1.10) 
Cohort 9  0.008  0.124  0.082  0.016  0.203 
  (0.17)  (1.72)+  (1.32)  (0.34)  (2.02)* 
Cohort 10  0.026  0.173  0.126  0.035  0.242 
  (0.54)  (2.28)*  (1.91)+  (0.68)  (2.27)* 
Cohort 11  0.057  0.224  0.153  0.070  0.290 
  (1.13)  (2.78)**  (2.20)*  (1.31)  (2.57)* 
Cohort 12  0.085  0.259  0.187  0.105  0.314 
  (1.60)  (3.09)**  (2.57)*  (1.85)+  (2.68)** 
Cohort 13  0.132  0.322  0.249  0.154  0.393 
  (2.32)*  (3.69)**  (3.25)**  (2.58)**  (3.21)** 
Cohort 14  0.063  0.292  0.214  0.085  0.509 
  (0.96)  (2.96)**  (2.42)*  (1.24)  (3.59)** 
Male head  0.022  0.031  0.028  0.018  0.036 
  (3.78)**  (3.39)**  (3.43)**  (2.87)**  (2.39)* 
Maori/Pacific head  0.075  0.098  0.096  0.080  0.056 
  (8.71)**  (8.33)**  (9.04)**  (9.34)**  (3.73)** 
Working head  0.155  0.169  0.168  0.146  0.048 
  (21.62)**  (15.38)**  (17.36)**  (19.14)**  (1.94)+ 
Unemployed head  -0.018  -0.041  -0.026  -0.020  -0.125 
  (0.93)  (1.84)+  (1.18)  (1.13)  (3.33)** 
Head has self-employmt  -0.059  0.059  0.017  -0.085  0.312 
 Income  (6.73)**  (3.21)**  (1.08)  (7.58)**  (11.40)** 
Paying mortgage  0.051  0.043  0.047  0.047  -0.001 
  (7.07)**  (4.73)**  (5.58)**  (6.69)**  (0.08) 
Rent/mortgage-free  0.149  0.277  0.241  0.134  0.344 
  (19.07)**  (20.78)**  (21.91)**  (15.53)**  (18.15)** 
Sole parent w/ children  -0.111  -0.142  -0.137  -0.113  -0.136 
  (10.97)**  (10.55)**  (11.54)**  (11.52)**  (6.77)** 
Couple with children  -0.056  -0.092  -0.085  -0.052  -0.125 
  (8.94)**  (8.83)**  (9.59)**  (7.54)**  (8.56)** 
Constant  -6.155  -7.003  -5.716  -5.152  -6.690 
  (8.21)**  (6.57)**  (5.96)**  (6.87)**  (4.22)** 
Sample size  46269  46245  46112  44880  31514 
R-squared  0.022  0.054  0.053  0.042  0.054 
Note:  
Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10% level 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. Each regression includes a fifth-order polynomial in age of the household head 
and 13 time dummies, with coefficients constrained to sum up to zero and to be orthogonal to a linear trend. Excluded categories are 
female head, non-Maori and non-Pacific head, head not in the labour force, dwelling is rented, family type is single adult, couple 
without children, mixed and non-family. For each regression, tests of the hypothesis that either the age, cohort or time effects are 




Table 7.1: Cohort Effects in Mean Saving Rates With Different Definitions of Consumption and Saving  



























           
Mean S/X  0.353  0.293  0.177  0.263  0.065 
           
Cohort 2  -0.058  -0.075  -0.075  -0.060  -0.088 
  (1.36)  (1.83)+  (1.84)+  (1.46)  (2.30)* 
Cohort 3  -0.076  -0.109  -0.092  -0.072  -0.114 
  (1.70)+  (2.55)*  (2.16)*  (1.68)+  (2.84)** 
Cohort 4  -0.140  -0.178  -0.122  -0.141  -0.153 
  (2.93)**  (3.86)**  (2.65)**  (3.07)**  (3.55)** 
Cohort 5  -0.161  -0.219  -0.121  -0.172  -0.177 
  (3.02)**  (4.28)**  (2.40)*  (3.37)**  (3.78)** 
Cohort 6  -0.082  -0.158  -0.054  -0.112  -0.139 
  (1.31)  (2.62)**  (0.98)  (1.88)+  (2.71)** 
Cohort 7  0.028  -0.078  0.072  -0.040  -0.069 
  (0.37)  (1.08)  (1.03)  (0.56)  (1.06) 
Cohort 8  0.086  -0.035  0.134  -0.008  -0.040 
  (1.16)  (0.49)  (1.97)*  (0.11)  (0.64) 
Cohort 9  0.155  0.012  0.195  0.041  -0.008 
  (1.91)+  (0.16)  (2.64)**  (0.54)  (0.12) 
Cohort 10  0.204  0.051  0.247  0.070  0.019 
  (2.36)*  (0.62)  (3.16)**  (0.86)  (0.27) 
Cohort 11  0.254  0.091  0.292  0.100  0.044 
  (2.78)**  (1.04)  (3.57)**  (1.16)  (0.58) 
Cohort 12  0.284  0.115  0.329  0.118  0.065 
  (2.99)**  (1.26)  (3.86)**  (1.32)  (0.84) 
Cohort 13  0.350  0.163  0.393  0.184  0.116 
  (3.54)**  (1.71)+  (4.43)**  (1.97)*  (1.43) 
Cohort 14  0.336  0.128  0.393  0.157  0.092 
  (2.99)**  (1.18)  (3.94)**  (1.49)  (1.00) 
Male head  0.037  0.037  0.021  0.031  0.019 
  (3.17)**  (3.38)**  (1.98)*  (2.81)**  (1.93)+ 
Maori/Pacific head  0.095  0.112  0.103  0.101  0.118 
  (7.69)**  (9.29)**  (9.28)**  (8.78)**  (11.57)** 
Working head  0.159  0.149  0.117  0.116  0.080 
  (9.50)**  (9.24)**  (7.44)**  (7.17)**  (5.42)** 
Unemployed head  -0.060  -0.044  -0.031  -0.044  -0.012 
  (2.22)*  (1.71)+  (1.25)  (1.71)+  (0.52) 
Head has self-employmt  0.075  0.068  0.063  0.067  0.052 
 Income  (3.59)**  (3.47)**  (3.64)**  (3.47)**  (3.46)** 
Paying mortgage  0.043  0.038  0.026  -0.058  -0.052 
  (4.54)**  (4.20)**  (3.25)**  (6.79)**  (7.41)** 
Rent/mortgage-free  0.297  0.261  0.209  0.257  0.158 
  (19.56)**  (18.17)**  (16.10)**  (18.03)**  (13.42)** 
Sole parent w/ children  -0.147  -0.141  -0.113  -0.112  -0.083 
  (9.76)**  (9.76)**  (8.58)**  (7.88)**  (6.93)** 
Couple with children  -0.103  -0.113  -0.089  -0.086  -0.081 
  (8.70)**  (10.06)**  (8.48)**  (7.93)**  (8.81)** 
Constant  -7.852  -7.462  -6.982  -5.802  -5.234 
  (6.36)**  (6.29)**  (6.16)**  (4.97)**  (5.01)** 
           
R-squared  0.040  0.024  0.040  0.044  0.044 Note:  
Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10% level 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. Each regression includes a fifth-order polynomial in age of the household head 
and 13 time dummies, with coefficients constrained to sum up to zero and to be orthogonal to a linear trend. Excluded categories are 
female head, non-Maori and non-Pacific head, head not in the labour force, dwelling is rented, family type is single adult, couple 
without children, mixed and non-family, head has a university qualifications. N=46269. 
a The estimates in this column are reproduced from column (iii) of Table 6.2. 
b Insurance includes both health and life insurance. 
c Durables includes motor vehicles. 
d The mortgage repayments are only for the principle. 
 
e Total consumption is current consumption expenditures plus medical, health and insurance spending, plus durables expenditures, 
plus mortgage principle repayments and contributions to savings. 




Birth years   Saving Rate (a)  Working life  Peak Saving 
Years 
1  1910-1914  0 (b)  1930-1974  1955-1969 
2  1915-1919  0 (b)  1935-1980  1960-1974 
3  !920 -1924  Negative  1940-1984  1965-1979 
4  1925-1929  Negative  1945-1989  1970-1984 
5  1930-1934  Negative  1950-1994  1975-1990 
9  !950-1954  Positive  1970-2014  1995-2010 
10  1955-1959  Positive  1975-2019  2000-2014 
Notes: 
a.  Refers to lifetime saving rate relative to the 1910-14 reference group.. 
b.  !910-14 is the reference group (by definition zero). See pattern of cohort dummies in 
the regressions presented in Section 6. Negative and positive refer to the cohorts that 
were typically significantly lower or higher in their lifetime saving rates.  
Appendix Table A: Wald tests of joint statistical significance of age and cohort effects in the unrestricted ‘Deaton Chapter 6’ regressions 
  ln (disposable income)    ln (current consumption) 








































































Population sub-groups (all based on cell medians) 
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p<0.000 Note: Results are Wald tests of the hypothesis that coefficients on either age or cohort dummy variables are jointly zero in a seeming-
unrelated regression model where ln Y and ln X are each regressed on age and cohort dummies and on cell averages of the number of 
children, adults and old people per household. The sample is 840 cell averages (medians or means as noted), where cells are based on the 
interaction of age (19-74 inclusive) and survey year (1984-98). The regressions on household type sub-groups exclude the variables 
counting number of children, adults and elderly, to avoid singularity problems. 
The population sub-groups formed according to school qualifications of the household head exclude data from 1987 and exclude 
observations where the qualification is not applicable (applied to most household heads older than 64) or not specified. 
a The mixed family and non-family household types are excluded. 
b The rent-free category is excluded 
 Figure 1: Household Saving Rate  
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1997-98Figure 3.1: Household Saving Rates by Five-Year Birth Cohort 
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Key      5=1930-34    10=1955-59 
1=1910-14    6=1935-39    11=1960-64 
2=1915-19    7=1940-44    12=1965-69 
3=1920-24    8=1945-49    13=1970-74 
4=1925-29    9=1950-54    14=1975-79  
Figure 4.1:  Age Effects in (log) Income and Consumption and in the Derived Saving Rate [ln(y)-ln(c)]   
 
           
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
 
           
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 Figure 4.2:  Cohort Effects in (log) Income and Consumption and in the Derived Saving Rate [ln(y)-ln(c)] 
                                 
 
                 
 
                   
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
 
                 
 
                   
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                           
 Figure 4.3:  Age and Cohort Effects in Income, Consumption and Saving Rates [ln(y)-ln(c)] for Male and Female-headed Households 
 
            
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
                
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
                Figure 4.4:  Age and Cohort Effects in Income, Consumption and Saving Rates [ln(y)-ln(c)] by Ethnicity of Household Head 
   
 
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










































 Figure 4.6: Age and Cohort Effects in Saving Rates [ln (y) - ln (c)] for Individuals and Households  
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Cohort: age in 1984
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Cohort: age in 1984







































 Figure 5.4: Age, Cohort and Time Decomposition at 25
th and 75
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Cohort: age in 1984



















































Age of Household Head


















Cohort: age in 1984










































Figure 5.5: Age, Cohort and Time Decomposition of Mean Savings Rate: Male versus 
Female-headed households  
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Figure 5.6: Age, Cohort and Time Decomposition of Mean Savings Rate: Maori and Pacific 
Islander-headed households Compared with Other Households 
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Mean + demographic controls
Adding employment controls
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Figure 6.4: Cohort Effects With Different Estimation Samples
















































































































Figure 7.1: Cohort Effects With Different Definitions of Saving
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